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HOWARD P. BENARD, ESQ.*
It is a Saturday morning in late May, and the Yankees of the Wyck-
off, New Jersey Recreation Little League have taken the field ready to
do battle against the Royals. The Yankees, as well as their opponent, are
composed of 7th and 8th graders. This age level is the players' last op-
portunity to participate in the Wyckoff Recreation Little League. The
coach and his two assistants are recent college graduates and are only
twenty-three years of age.
The morning provided the two teams with a picture perfect blue sky.
Although it was humid, typical of New Jersey, it was a beautiful day to
play baseball. The Yankees had Brian, their star pitcher, on the mound:
a lefty 8th grader who was the first pick overall in the 7th and 8th grade
league draft. Everything, from the perspective of the Yankees's coach-
ing staff, was perfect.
The fourth inning rolled around with the Yankees ahead of the
Royals by a score of three to one. Brian was pitching magnificently up
to that point, but then he walked the first two Royals's batters leading
off their half of the inning. The next batter, a lefty, stepped up to the
plate and Brian, knowing he had to bear down, threw him an inside
pitch ..... CRACK!!! No, it was not the sound of bat on ball, but the
sound of a bone breaking! Brian's fastball had struck the batter in the
face, resulting in obvious concern and a broken jaw.
It was unlike Brian to throw inside. However, this was a lefty batter
and 98% of the batters Brian had pitched to in his short career had been
righties.
The Yankees went on to win the game. But, that afternoon, the
Yankees's coaching staff was not celebrating because that afternoon
brought a phone call. The Yankees's coaches were informed that they
were to be named as parties in a civil lawsuit to be filed that coming
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Monday by the parents of the child who suffered the broken jaw. The
parents claimed that the Yankees's coaches were tortious,' specifically
citing negligence,2 thereby proclaiming that they were legally responsible
for the injury sustained by their child.
Fortunately for the Yankees's coaches, this account was fictitious.
However, reality has proven otherwise.' One needs to recognize, before
1. The term "tort" is generally used to convey a breach of a duty (other than a contractual
duty and it is not labeled a crime) by an individual. The tort, also regarded as a civil wrong,
can be remedied in a court of law in an action for damages. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 at 1,2 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter "PRoSSER AND
KEETON"].
Wrongful; of the nature of a tort. [U]sed throughout the Restatement, Second, Torts,
to denote the fact that conduct whether of act or omission is of such a character as to
subject the actor to liability, under the principles of the law of torts. (§ 6). To establish
"tortious act" plaintiff must prove not only existence of actionable wrong, but also that
damages resulted therefrom.
Id. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter "BLACK'S"].
2. As a starting point, the term "negligence" is defined as: "Failure to exercise the care
that a prudent person usually exercises." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICION-
ARY 566 (7th ed. 1965). In a legal context, "negligence" can be defined as:
The omission to do something which a reasonable [person], guided by those ordinary
considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of some-
thing which a reasonable and prudent [person] would not do. Negligence is the failure
to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar
circumstances[.]
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1032 (6th ed. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 282 (1977) ("[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.")
3. See Creighton Hale, Litigation League, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1995, at A14. Hale writes
of little leaguers who, upon injury, turn to their coaches as viable parties to be held legally
accountable by claiming that they acted negligently:
The batter hits a pop fly to center, but your centerfielder is playing the position for the
first time.... The pop fly hits him in the eye.... In a real-life case similar to the one
described here, the centerfielder's parents filed suit against the coach who stationed
their child under the malevolent pop fly. They sought compensation for pain and suf-
fering, as well as punitive damages .... In recent years, litigation has been the end
result of two boys colliding in the outfield (the two picked themselves up and sued the
coach). Another player sued when a stray dog intruded on the field of play and bit
him. In still another case, a man and a woman won a cash settlement when the woman
was hit by a ball a player failed to catch. The player was her daughter.
Id.; see also Little League Bill Is Irresistible But Shortsighted, NEWSDAY (NEW YORK),
May 6, 1989, at 18 (Viewpoints) ("Little League volunteers were once sued after a player was
struck by lightning while standing at third base.")
However, the case that has commanded the most attention, and may have served as a
catalyst for the enacting of legislation, involved a 10-year-old little leaguer in Runnemede,
New Jersey in 1985. See Dan Holly, Sports leagues reeling from liability 'hardball', STAR-
LEDGER (NEWARK), Mar. 2, 1986, at 1, col. 2 ("In Camden County,... a mother filed a
$750,000 damage suit against the Runnemede Youth Athletic Association and several coaches
after her 10-year-old son was hit in the face when he misjudged a fly ball while warming up for
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volunteering one's time, that one could potentially be named in a negli-
gence lawsuit by the very children one coaches; or by the other children
in one's league. The prospect of being held legally accountable for an
injury that would be thought and categorized as a "part of the game,"4 is
something people may be unaware of prior to signing up to serve as a
volunteer. After all, individuals sign up to volunteer as coaches for the
prospects of having fun and being able to contribute to their town
leagues, which they may have participated in when they were children.5
Clearly it is not for the prospect of being sued by an injured child or that
a baseball game."); Little League Suit, N.Y. TimEs, May 9, 1985, at B18 (Sports People) (re-
porting that a Little League outfielder filed suit against four of his coaches after sustaining an
eye injury caused by his misjudging a fly ball during the team warm-up); Committee Hearing
on Health Reform Issues: Antitrust, Medical Malpractice, Volunteer Protection, 1996 WL
81,963 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of the Honorable John Edward Porter before the House Judici-
ary Committee) ("One of the most widely reported horror stories involved Little League
coaches in Runnemede, New Jersey, who were sued when a fly ball injured a young player in
the outfield .... This case was settled for $125,000."); 137 CONG. Rc. S8,310-01, S8,344 (daily
ed. June 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Deconcini) ("The parents argued that their child was a
natural shortstop, and sued the coach for negligently playing the child in an unfamiliar posi-
tion [centerfield]. The case was settled out of court for $25,000 [sic]."); 136 CONG. REC.
H7,521-02, H7,533 (daily ed. Sep. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Tauke) ("The allegation: the
child was an infielder, not an outfielder and the coaches knew this."); 136 CONG. REc. S1,782-
02, S1,786 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1990) (statement of Sen. McConnell) ("His parents sued the
coach for failing to recognize that the 10-year-old was a born infielder. The National Little
League was overwhelmed with calls by coaches from across the country who were worried
they would be sued if they moved a player from one position to another.")
4. See generally Mel Narol, Sports Participation With Limited Liability: The Emerging
Reckless Disregard Standard, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 29 (1991) (discussing the proper duty
to be imposed in vigorous athletic competition; recognizing that athletes do not have an ex-
pectation of being injured, but they do aspire to engage in "vigorous competition"). It is here
that one can begin to think about one's duty to another while engaged in athletic competition.
It is also here that one can begin to think about what duty of care a volunteer coach owes to
those athletic participants. See also RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §, 4 cmt. a (1977).
[A) duty that the actor shall conduct himself or not conduct himself in a particular
manner. It therefore imposes no obligation which is not within the actor's ability to
perform, since it relates only to the actor's conduct over which as such he has con-
trol.... [W]hether or not he is liable depends upon whether his breach of duty results
in an injury to someone to whom the duty is owing in such a manner as to make the
breach of the duty a legal cause of the injury, and this depends upon the course of
events subsequent to the actor's breach of his duty, a matter over which the actor has
no effective control...
Id.
5. The positive feelings experienced by volunteers are captured in several periodicals. See
Gene Pomerance, The Care and Feeling of Volunteers, PARKS & RECREATION, Nov. 1994, at
54 (identifying and describing the various reasons why people volunteer); Stephen King &
Harry Connolly, Diamonds Are Forever, LiFE, May 1, 1994, at 26 (words and photographs
capturing the pureness of little league baseball).
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child's parents, who often believe that someone is to be held accounta-
ble; someone other than themselves.6
Let us assume that this article's fictitious account was true: where
would that leave the Yankees's coaches? Luckily for these coaches, they
lived in New Jersey; a state which specifically provides statutory protec-
tion for volunteer "coaches."7 In fact, many states do provide statutory
protection for volunteer coaches, but there is a larger number of states
that do not.8 And, herein lies one part of the problem for volunteer
coaches: the applicability of negligence or the degree of culpable con-
6. See William J. Cople III, Unfair Lawsuits Threaten Volunteers, WASHMGTON LEGAL
FOUND. (Dec. 16, 1994), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S17,776-02, S17,779 (daily ed. Nov. 29,
1995). William J. Cople III stated that:
Volunteer service is under assault from an unlikely quarter - the civil justice sys-
tem .... [Civil justice should not be used recklessly to inhibit beneficial conduct that
may involve some amount of risk.... In the past, the courts seem to have understood
that some circumstances, even ones of tragic proportion, are simply caused by accident
or misfortune, and not necessarily by culpable conduct on the part of any other person.
Yet, this now has become an unacceptable conclusion. Every conceivable circumstance
in which we deal and interact with each other seems to create a victim. This has
spawned the civil litigation clogging the courts, as every victim of circumstances seeks
compensation by shifting the blame for those circumstances to someone else.
Id. (emphasis added); see also 142 CONrG. REc. E1,445-02 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement
of the Honorable Michael N. Castle) (acknowledging the work of Christina Cabrera of Sea-
ford, DE who stated that "[t]he most important part of answering America's call is to cease
playing the blame game. By making oneself a victim and shifting the blame on everyone else,
one only adds to the problems plaguing our country."); 141 CONG. REc. H15,548-01 (daily ed.
Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Foley) ("It is also important at this time that we all accept
responsibility for our actions. It is about time that we stop trying to place the blame on other
people.... Far too often people are looking to blame others in society."); 1996 WL 90811
(F.D.C.H.) (Feb. 28, 1996) (statement of Sen. McConnell before the House of Representatives
Judiciary) ("Let me turn to another aspect of the legal crisis - those who are victimized by
lawsuits: the selfless volunteers who help worthy organizations and institutions. When the
legal system ensnares these individuals, the result is too many people pointing fingers and too
few offering a helping hand."); Hale, supra note 3 ("As a society, we need to remember that
because it's not your fault doesn't mean it must be someone else's. As every centerfielder
knows, sometimes the sun just gets in your eyes.").
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6 (West 1986). The use of the term "coach" will hereinafter
include the terms/titles of manager and athletic instructor as well. The terms/titles of umpire,
referee, and official are not included within the scope of "coach" because there are certain
states that only provide statutory protection for those kinds of volunteers, while at the same
time do not recognize the need to protect volunteer coaches. See infra notes 128-132 and
accompanying text.
8. A list of those states that have no statutory law specifically protecting volunteer
coaches as of the time that this article was written: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Delaware (bill proposed), Hawaii (bill proposed), Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York (bill pro-
posed), North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Vermont. See also infra Part IV (for a
more in-depth look).
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duct in recreational sports used in determining whether a volunteer
coach's conduct is negligent.9 If one has the answer to that question, one
is then ready to address the second part of the volunteer coach's prob-
lem: the interpretation of that defined culpable conduct and under-
standing when a volunteer coach's conduct amounts to negligence. This
inevitably leads to an inquiry as to who is to be directed with making
that culpability determination when a volunteer coach's conduct is di-
rectly in question - a judge, a jury, or a state's legislature?10
Why is there no uniformity (in terms of applicability and interpreta-
tion) in this area of the law? If there are states with statutes enacted for
the sole purpose of protecting volunteer coaches, then why do not all
states simply provide statutes specifically aimed at protecting volunteer
coaches? This is especially pertinent when one takes into consideration
that all states typically offer sports like baseball, football, soccer, and
basketball, through the creation of recreational programs, organized and
sponsored by Little League, Inc., Pop Warner Football, or through a mu-
nicipal or town recreation department.
Simply put, the discrepancy in state liability rules for recreational
athletics - especially when evaluating whether a volunteer coaches'
conduct is compulsory - produces a confusion in understanding, result-
ing in legal questions as to what is not acceptable conduct. This will then
lead to apprehension and reluctance on the part of the prospective vol-
unteer coach to even get involved. It should truly make one think that
volunteer coaches should get a salary for just figuring out what the appli-
9. For example, depending upon the state, one's conduct in a particular activity may sub-
ject that person to liability if a jury could find negligence based upon an "ordinary negligence"
standard; while a neighboring state may not draw the same conclusion because the jury was
required to weigh the conduct against a "gross negligence" standard. Although not sports
related cases, see Traphagan v. Mid-America Traffic Marking, 555 N.W. 2d 778, 785 (Neb.
1996) ("Ordinary negligence is defined as doing something that a reasonably careful person
would not do under similar circumstances, or failing to do something that a reasonably careful
person would do under similar circumstances.") compare with Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 934
S.W. 2d 439, 447 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) ("'Gross negligence' means more than momentary
thoughtlessness, inadvertence or error of judgment so as to constitute an entire want of care as
to establish that the acts or omissions ... were the result of actual conscious indifference to the
rights, safety or welfare of the persons effected."); State v. Clark, 556 N.W. 2d 820, 822 (Mich.
1996) ("Gross negligence means more than carelessness. It means willfully disregarding the
results to others that might follow from an act or failure to act.")
10. In one form or another, every state provides some form of protection for volunteers;
however, the tricky part is deciphering exactly who and what classes of people are protected.
See generally Charles Tremper, Volunteers Vulnerable: Protective Laws are a Shield Full of
Holes, 4 Bus. L. TODAY 22 (Nov/Dec 1994) ("One result of all the legislation is a false sense
of security among some volunteers, combined with uncertainty among volunteers and lawyers
about the scope and effectiveness of the new laws.")
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cable standard of care is and how their conduct is going to be measured
against that standard."
Accordingly, this article advances the position that there is no accept-
able reason for any state 12 to avoid providing specific statutory protection
for volunteer coaches,13 who go uncompensated (but not unappreciated),
while participating in a municipal or town recreational sports program or
non-profit organization sponsored sports athletic league. Part I explores
the notion of "negligence" and how our lawsuit happy society has come
to view a child's misjudging a fly ball as a cause of action against an
individual who may, incidentally, have the most economic wealth. Part
II explores volunteerism, its impact in this country and its need to be
preserved as a social institution. Part III addresses the role of legislation
and how a prospective volunteer coach's apprehensiveness, due to the
susceptibility of being sued, can be subdued through the enactment of
protective legislation (but is this a matter for the states or for the Federal
Government to address?). Part IV looks to the states and their respec-
tive legislators for providing volunteer coaches with statutory protection.
This section focuses on the language used in New Jersey's statute, which
sets out an appropriate standard for volunteer coaches and officials to be
measured against.'
4
11. For a related view, see Jamie Brown, Comment, Legislators Strike Out: Volunteer Lit-
tle League Coaches Should not be Immune from Tort Liability, 23 (1997) (manuscript to be
published in SETON HALL J. SPORT L.), where Brown points out that depending upon the State
that one lives in, a volunteer coach's standard of care will vary, inevitably leading to inconsis-
tency. And although Brown advocates economic recovery for the injured participant, poten-
tially at the expense of the volunteer coach, one could conclude that even Brown himself
concedes that there is a need for nationwide uniformity in this area of tort law.
12. This is also meant to include the District of Columbia.
13. For the purposes of this article "specific statutory protection for volunteer coaches"
indicates the enacting of a standard where a volunteer recreational coach will be provided
with statutory immunity for conduct that does not amount to "willful and wanton negligence"
or "willful and wanton misconduct."
Under such a standard, a volunteer recreational coach's conduct will constitute "willful
and wanton negligence" when there is: "[a f]ailure to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury
to a person who is actually known to be, or reasonably is expected to be, within range of a
known danger." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1600. Therefore, conduct that amounts to "willful
and wanton negligence" can also be characterized as "willful and wanton misconduct." Where
"willful and wanton misconduct" is defined as the "[flailure to exercise ordinary care to pre-
vent injury to a person who is actually known to be or reasonably expected to be within the
range of a dangerous act being done." Id. (citing Georgia Press Co. v. Deese, 51 S.E.2d 724,
728 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949)).
For a statutory example, establishing "willful and wanton negligence" as the applicable
standard by which a volunteer coach should be judged, one should refer to the legislation
enacted by New Jersey. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6(C)(1) (1995).
14. That applicable standard is set out in § 2A:62A-6(c)(1).
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LITTLE LEAGUE FUN, BIG LEAGUE LIABILITY
In short, New Jersey's legislated standard should be viewed as creat-
ing a foundation upon which nationwide uniformity can be achieved in
this area of the law.
I. WHAT ARE VOLUNTEER COACHES DOING, OR FOR THAT
MA ER NOT DOING, THAT ENABLES LAWSUITS
TO BE BROUGHT AGAINST THEM
CLAIMING NEGLIGENCE?
Problems in the applicability and interpretation of negligence law are
resolved when nationwide uniformity is achieved. If the goal of tort law
is to assign responsibility to someone for causing another's injury - re-
sulting in that someone being obligated to compensate that injured per-
son'" - then that goal can only be achieved when its standards are
practiced throughout society. Uniformity can be understood to mean
that when an individual engages in a particular activity, he or she will
understand the probable ramifications of his or her conduct and the eco-
nomic responsibilities that may follow.
What constitutes actionable negligence must be determined objec-
tively. Even the judicial system recognizes that subjectivity influences its
determinations of assigning responsibility and awarding compensation;
as the judge and jury are all active participants in the subjective society.
Consequentially, an objective force is introduced and utilized in the judi-
cial system. A force none other than "our fictitious friend," the reason-
able (and prudent) man. 6 The reasonable man is society's reaction to
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person causing dam-
age by his willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act of commission or omission, nor to any
coach, manager, or official who has not participated in a safety orientation and training
skills program which program shall include but not be limited to injury prevention and
first aid procedures and general coaching concepts.
Id. (emphasis added).
15. "[Tort law] affords a measure of protection against harmful activities; in addition it
gives compensation to the injured person." WARREN SEAVEY, COGrrIIONS ON TORTS 3
(1956).
16. RESTATEMENT (sEcOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1977).
The words 'reasonable man' denote a person exercising those qualities of attention,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the
protection of their own interests and the interests of others. It enables those who are to
determine whether the actor's conduct is such as to subject him to liability for harm
caused thereby, to express their judgment in terms of the conduct of a human being.
The fact that this judgment is personified in a 'man' calls attention to the necessity of
taking into account the fallibility of human beings.
Id. at cmt. b; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 32, at 173 (history and characteri-
zation of the "reasonable person"); OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, JR., Ti COiMON LAW 137
1997]
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subjective decision making,' 7 whereby the reasonable man becomes our
measuring stick for judging whether the actor's acts or omissions were so
unreasonable that he be found guilty of negligence.' For the reasonable
person standard to be determined objectively, the community must not
assume or create unfounded expectations about a particular actor's con-
duct. The volunteer coach participating in a community's recreational
athletic league is a reasonable man; whose conduct must be evaluated
objectively.
The volunteer coach is not the equal of a professional or even semi-
professional coach.' 9 Rather, volunteer coaches are active community
participants extending their time and energies for the benefit of the com-
munity's children. 20 The success of a recreational league will depend
(Little, Brown and Company 1923) (1881) ("the average prudent member of the community"
is founded on moral ground).
17. "The reasonable man is a fictitious person, who is never negligent, and whose conduct
is always up to standard .... It is therefore error to instruct the jury that the conduct of a
reasonable man is to be determined by what they would themselves have done." RESTATE-
MEr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1977).
18. "[Cjonduct cannot be either right or wrong without other conduct with which to com-
pare it, or without reference to consequences. There must be reference to some pre-conceived
standard of comparison, as to which the conduct described falls above or below." Warren A.
Seavey, Negligence - Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1927). "The question
for judges and juries is not what a man was thinking or not thinking about, expecting or not
expecting, but whether his behaviour [sic] was or was not such as we demand of a prudent
man under the given circumstances." POLLOCK, TORTS, 12 ed., 443, quoted in Henry W. Edg-
erton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; The Relation of Mental States To Negligence,
39 HARv. L. REv. 849, 863 (1926) (footnote omitted). "It has often been laid down that
negligence is doing what a reasonable and prudent man would not have done or not doing
what such a man would have done." Henry Terry, Negligence, 29 Hv. L. REv. 40, 41
(1915).
19. For a related view, see Ian M. Burnstein, Note, Liability for Injuries Suffered in the
Course of Recreational Sports: Application of the Negligence Standard, 71 U. DET. MERCY L.
REv. 993, 1016 (1994). Although the discussion focuses on the proper standard of care be-
tween co-participants, Burnstein strongly suggests that the particpants' status in recreational
sports needs to be distinguished from the status for participants in professional sports. The
courts need to recognize that the two types of athletic participant status cannot be assessed
using the same criteria.
20. Consider the message behind the closing argument made by counsel for the City of
Manchester. He was trying to convince the jury that the City's supervision for the Southside
Junior High School cheerleading team was not negligent:
This case is about who loses if you return a verdict in favor of [plaintiff] and you send a
message to the community that what [the teacher] did in this case was wrong and if you
volunteer and if a kid gets injured you could be spending the next couple of days just
where he has been spending it [in a court of law]. The only ones who lose in that
situation are the kids because, as [the teacher] said, he wouldn't do this again and you
are not going to have all those programs that are provided only because people volun-
teer. The kids who are taking advantage of those programs are taking advantage of them
because of volunteers.
[Vol. 8:93
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upon community support. To this extent, the community has consented
to the volunteer coach's ability and inability to teach, instruct, and en-
courage its children on how to participate and compete in recreational
athletic sports.
It would be blatantly unrealistic to expect a volunteer coach to pos-
sess the equivalent skill, knowledge, and foresight of a high school, col-
lege, or professional coach. However, that is not to suggest that the
volunteer coach should not be expected to exercise due care. Exercising
due care should mean that the volunteer coach, while acting in a capacity
reasonably expected by someone in his or her position, does not exhibit
conduct that amounts to willful and wanton negligence."
"Negligence is a departure from a standard of conduct demanded by
the community for the protection of others against unreasonable risk."2
Accordingly, negligence could be the result of "a lack of common knowl-
edge, memory, observation, imagination, foresight, intelligence, judg-
ment, quickness of reaction, deliberation, coolness, self-control,
determination, courage, or altruism."'  Therefore, in establishing a lia-
bility rule, the reasonable person in the volunteer coach context must be
determined independently from the reasonable person standard used in
the more structured and advanced coaching or instructing contexts.24 In
Walton v. City of Manchester, 666 A.2d 978-980 (N.H. 1995) (emphasis added) (the case was
reversed and remanded due to the trial court erring in granting a new trial to plaintiff).
21. Although it would appear intended for high school and collegiate coaches, consider
that the
[p]revalent case law and legal commentary establish the following specific duties upon
coaches: (1) supervision; (2) training and instruction; (3) ensuring the proper use of
safe equipment; (4) providing competent and responsible personnel; (5) warning of
latent dangers; (6) providing prompt and proper medical care; (7) preventing injured
athletes from competing; and (8) matching athletes of similar competitive levels.
See Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide To The Legal Liability Of
Coaches For A Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 15-16 (1996) (foot-
note omitted).
22. RuSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 283 cmt. c (1977).
23. Edgerton, supra note 18, at 856.
24. Recreational volunteer coaches and the young players they coach, do not possess the
same levels of athletic experience and ability to understand the risks (whether they are fore-
seeable or unforeseeable) involved with participating in an athletic activity as compared to
those participants who engage in athletic activities for various rewards (i.e., monetary gain and
scholastic achievement). See, e.g., Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d
1198 (Pa. 1981) (high school football player injured while trying to impress the high school
football coaches); Fortier v. Los Rios Community College Dist., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812 (Cal. Ct.
App. 3d 1996) (college offered an "advanced football" class whose instructors were also the
college's football coaches); Harvey v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 674 So.2d 372 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (high school football player, regarded as a "star" player, sustained an injury preventing
him from pursuing football on an athletic scholarship level); Zalkin v. American Learning Sys.,
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keeping with the same rationale, a liability rule calling for a finding of
ordinary negligence or invoking either the confusing and misleading as-
sumption of risk2 and unavoidable accident26 doctrines are extreme and
639 So.2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (high school football player, starting for his team as a
defensive tackle, sued the high school's coach for "failure to supervise the sport properly");
Wattenbarger v. Cincinnati Reds, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1994) (professional
baseball team held tryouts for invited participants aged 16 to 21, where upon a high school
baseball player tried out and sustained an injury in the process); Tan v. Goddard, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 4d 1993) (plaintiff wanted to become a jockey, and relied upon the
knowledge and experience of the riding school's instructors); Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1993) (plaintiff was an accomplished equestrian who
sued her instructor at the riding club for injuries resulting from a horse jumping mishap).
Thus, professional, collegiate, and high school athletics create a more mature brand of
competition where there is a better understanding for the notion of competition and a better
appreciation for the particular sport's parameters. Whereas, little league recreational leagues
exist to promote teamwork, develop skills, and an interest in the particular sport, as opposed
to those who look at the more competitive levels of athletic competition believing that they
promote "the infliction of pain" and possess a knowledge of inherent danger. See Burnstein,
supra note 19, at 1013; Fortier, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812 (aggressiveness essential element in the
game of football); Yancey v. Super. Ct. of Stanislaus County, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777,780 (Cal. Ct.
App. 5th 1994) (vigorous participation breeds careless behavior).
25. Assumption of risk is defined as: "[A] plaintiff may not recover for an injury to which
he assents, i.e., that a person may not recover for an injury received when he voluntarily
exposes himself to a known and appreciated danger." BLACK's, supra note 1, at 123; see also
REsTATEmENT (sEcoND) OF ToRTs § 496 A (1977) ("A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a
risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for
such harm.").
The doctrine's scope, however, is limited: its application is only appropriate as a defense
against claims for ordinary or mere negligence. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 712
(Cal. 1992); Fortier, 52 Cal. Rptr. 812; Tan, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 91; Galardi, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 272;
Rich v. West Shore Little League Baseball, Inc., 209 A.D.2d 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Strauss
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 201 A.D.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
This article acknowledges that mishaps and accidents, resulting in injury, will occur within
the context of participating in recreational sports. Thus, this article also advances the position
that in order to sustain a cause of action, in a court of law, against a volunteer coach, more
than ordinary negligence must be maintained. Cf Zalkin, 639 So.2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) ("express assumption of risk is not a bar to an action for negligent supervision of a
minor engaged in a contact sport.") Moreover, the assumption of risk doctrine has no place in
a liability scheme that establishes as its level of culpability "willful and wanton negligence."
Beyond the discussion of what liability scheme will encompass the doctrine's applicability,
assumption of risk has been regarded as complex. When seen as a jury instruction, it is often
cited as a source for confusion. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 699 ("As every leading tort
treatise has explained, the assumption of risk doctrine long has caused confusion both in defi-
nition and application.. ."); Rutter, 437 A.2d at 1208. In fact, a number of jurisdictions, recog-
nizing the inadequacies with the doctrine's application, have abolished the assumption of risk
defense. See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 630 A.2d 368, 372 (NJ. 1993) ("'Assumption of risk' is
not a sound basis for incorporating a sports-injury immunity in New Jersey law. The concept
of assumption of risk was essentially written out of our jurisprudence by Meistrich v. Casino
Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959).... [and] emphatically reaffirmed in McGrath
v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238 (N.J. 1963).. ."); Rutter, 437 A.2d at 1210 n.5 ("We
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note that nineteen other jurisdictions have either seriously modified or abolished the assump-
tion of risk doctrine.")
On the other hand, California recognizes the assumption of risk defense, creating two dis-
tinct categories for interpreting cases: 1) primary assumption of risk: "by virtue of the nature
of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to
protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury[;]" and 2) secon-
dary assumption of risk: "occurs when the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff but
the plaintiff knowingly encounters the risk of injury caused by defendant's breach of that duty.
[It] is merged into the comparative fault scheme[.]" See Yancey, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (adopting
the standard set out by the California Supreme Court in Knight v. Jewett); but see Knight, 834
P.2d at 712 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("I believe the time has come to eliminate implied assump-
tion of risk entirely.")
In sum, although the assumption of risk doctrine can be invoked where blame for sports
related mishaps are in question, the defense will only be considered where the duty of care
owed is that of ordinary negligence. But, as this article professes, the assumption of risk doc-
trine's rationale does not belong in the recreational sports context; because the players are
younger, more limited in their ability and understanding of the sports, and the coaches are
volunteers with limitations as to their ability to teach and prevent young children's mishaps.
See Dillard v. Little League Baseball Inc., 55 A.D.2d 477, 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
It cannot be said that it would be a total surprise for a nine year old to throw a pitch
after the umpire had called time out and before the umpire had called a resumption of
play. This kind of mistake, error, inadvertence or lack of attention is fully to be ex-
pected during the heat of a game from so young a player.
Id.
26. The unavoidable accident doctrine has been defined consistently by courts as,
an occurrence which is not contributed to by the negligent act or omission of either
party or which is not proximately caused by the negligence of any person. It is such an
occurrence as, under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or avoided in
the exercise of ordinary care.
Schaub v. Linehan, 442 P.2d 742,744 (Idaho 1968); see also Harrah v. Washington, 477 S.E.2d
281, 286 (Va. 1996); Burdette v. Madison, 719 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ark. 1986); Meyers v. Smith,
482 So.2d 60, 64 (La. Ct. App. 1986). Initially, the doctrine was utilized "when damages for
injuries to person or property directly caused by a voluntary act of the defendant could be
recovered in an action of trespass and when strict liability would be imposed unless the de-
fendant proved that the injury was caused through 'inevitable accident."' Butigan v. Yellow
Cab Co., 320 P.2d 500, 504 (Cal. 1958). However, courts have continually regarded the doc-
trine as being "obsolete" and "inapplicable," as well as criticized the doctrine's instruction and
application as "misleading" and "confusing." See Butigan, 320 P.2d at 504-05, cited with ap-
proval in Schaub, 442 P.2d 742; Dinda v. Sirois, 347 A.2d 75 (Conn. 1974); Burdette, 719
S.W.2d 418; Hunter v. Johnson, 359 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1987). Nevertheless, the doctrine has
not been completely abandoned. There are those rare instances where a court has found that,
under the circumstances of a particular case, the doctrine's application has been ruled appro-
priate. See Dorsey v. Williams, 525 So.2d 542 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (accident involving a driver
of an automobile and a child running suddenly into the street); see also Brown v. United States
Fire Insurance, 671 So.2d 1195 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (a child became a paraplegic after darting
out into the street and being struck by a school bus).
An authority, destined to be in the minority, may successfully render an opinion that reads:
Where the sudden acts of a child manifests an inevitable emergency situation, no liability for
the resulting injuries will be placed upon the volunteer coach so long as the volunteer coach
has employed all reasonable precautions. The incident would be dismissed as an unavoidable
accident. Nonetheless, this line of reasoning will not be explored or advocated in this article.
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insufficient responses in determining the duty of care owed by a volun-
teer recreational coach.
Recreational athletics - due to the age, limited ability, and overall
competence of the participants - accommodate unpredictability and the
It follows that if the unavoidable accident doctrine is to be thought of as an inappropriate
and unacceptable defense to a claim of negligence in the recreational sports context, so must
the "act of God" defense, a sub-set of the unavoidable accident doctrine, be viewed in the
same light.
The act of God defense generally entails the following requirements: the unforesee-
ability by reasonable human intelligence, and the absence of a human agency causing
the alleged damage.... The test is not whether the eventuality is likely or probable,
but whether it is foreseeable. Consequently, the defense is generally limited to truly
unforeseeable events, rather than situations involving unusual, but not unprecedented,
impacts.
See Denis Binder, Act of God? or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal Of The Act Of God Defense In
Tort Law, 15 REv. LrrIG.1, 13 (1995-96); see also Bradford v. Stanley, 355 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.
1978) ("In its legal sense an 'act of God' applies only to events in nature so extraordinary that
the history of climatic variations and other conditions in the particular locality affords no
reasonable warning of them."); Curtis v. Dewey, 475 P.2d 808, 810 (Idaho 1970) ("Negligence
cannot be predicated upon a failure to anticipate that which was so extraordinary and utterly
unprecedented as to have eluded the foresight of a reasonable man.")
Thus, the "act of God" doctrine could theoretically be viewed as a way to refute an action
for negligence; to the reasonable person an incident or risk of an incident, involving a child
participating in recreational athletics, could be seen as unforeseeable. Consider these two
incidents: 1) a little leaguer misjudges a fly ball and is consequently struck in the face by the
ball. The little leaguer claims that he was blinded by the bright sun and that his coaches acted
negligently in failing to teach him how to shade his eyes from the sun; and 2) the little league
centerfielder is again struck in the face, but this time he is struck by a bolt of lightning. The
game had started with the possibility for showers, but it was not until the game progressed did
the sky become increasingly overcast. Could not both incidents be categorized as "act[s] of
God?" Or, could one conclude that the centerfielder's being struck by lightning, like being
struck by a misjudged fly ball, is actionable by holding the coach responsible for placing the
child in that position? The answer to these questions, nevertheless, depends upon whether an
incident was foreseeable. See NEIL J. DOUGHERTY, ET AL., SPORT, PrYsicA. Acrivrrn, AND
THE LAW 241 (1994) (the "act of God" doctrine is properly invoked where an accident is
deemed beyond reasonable control); see also Binder, at 37 ("It seems clear that the act of God
defense rests on the twin pillars of lack of predictability and lack of control. If either pillar is
missing, the defense fails.") (footnote omitted); but see Little League Suit, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9,
1985, at B18 (Sports People) (when asked to sum up an incident involving a little leaguer, who
was hit in the eye by a pop fly while playing centerfield, Bill McGrath, a vice president of the
Runnemede [New Jersey] Little League, concluded that it was "an act of God," as opposed to
negligent coaching).
Like the unavoidable accident doctrine, the problem of jury confusion enters into the act
of God defense's application. See Binder, at 77. "In conclusion, the act of God defense is a
theory which no longer makes legal or factual sense. It is time to recognize that when looked
at in the context of the specifics, the act of God defense is simply an application of normal
negligence principles." Id. at 79. And in the context of recreational athletics, the application
of ordinary negligence principles are not appropriate for determining whether a volunteer
recreational coach should be held liable for injuries sustained by a player who misjudges a fly
ball or is struck by a bolt of lightning.
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inability of a volunteer coach to foresee every possible situation and its
consequences. If tort law's goal of assigning responsibility for injured
persons is to be achieved in the recreational sports arena, then it must be
recognized that a volunteer coach's conduct must be measured against a
willful and wanton negligence (or willful and wanton misconduct) stan-
dard of culpability.
Returning to this article's opening story concerning Brian's errant
pitch, one might begin to question how and why society would tolerate a
civil action being brought against the Yankees's coaches. The recent col-
lege graduates were volunteer recreational coaches, who never aspired
to become professional coaches and possessed no agenda other than to
contribute to the overall social welfare of their community.
In the meantime, consider how society should define the reasonable
person's attributes in the volunteer recreational athletic coach context.
Then, in applying this article's fictitious account, ask yourself; how could
the reasonable person allow such an unconscionable conclusion to be
drawn against such a community person?
A. A Strict Application Of Negligence's Elements, Under Either A
Traditional Framework Or Economic Model, Cannot Take
Into Full Account The Volunteer Coach's Social
Utility And Worth.
In civil actions, where a volunteer coach's conduct is at issue, a willful
and wanton negligence standard should be applied.27 However, before
the issue can be settled, consideration must be extended to negligence's
elements at common law. Asking for an ordinary negligence determina-
tion to be made will produce both inequitable results and resentment in
every community benefited by youth activities. This position is also
based upon the tenet that "[n]egligence is conduct, and not a state of
mind.... [T]he actor does not advert properly to the consequences that
may follow his conduct, and therefore fails to realize that his conduct is
unreasonably dangerous."2 To hold the volunteer recreational coach re-
27. Three of the major areas where lawsuits allege that a coach breached his/her duty of
care are: 1) the responsibility to provide effective supervision; 2) the responsibility to provide
appropriate and well-conducted activities; and 3) the responsibility to provide safe and appro-
priate environmental conditions. See NEtt J. DOUGHERTY, Er AL., supra note 26, at 250-51 &
Table 13.1; see also ROBERT W. KOEHLER, LAv SPORT ACTIVITY AND MANAGE ENT, Chapter
III ('Negligence') (1991).
28. Terry, supra note 18, at 40; but see Edgerton, supra note 18, at 859 ("When there is
negligent conduct, there has been a shortcoming in some mental respect; and when a short-
coming in any mental respect leads to dangerous conduct, it leads to negligent conduct.").
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sponsible for the injuries incurred by a child participant, there must be
more present than a lack of knowledge or an error in judgment. For
example, the question to be asked, should be whether the coach's con-
duct involved risk, "which he understands to be unreasonably great."'29
The traditional formula used in determining whether an individual
has acted negligently focuses on four elements:
a. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the per-
son to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protec-
tion of others against unreasonable risks.
b. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard re-
quired: a breach of the duty.
c. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and
the resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as 'legal
cause,' or 'proximate cause[.]'
d. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another...
[P]roof of damage [is] an essential part of the plaintiff's case. 0
However, because we are focusing on a volunteer coach's acts of omis-
sion or commission an additional element needs to be addressed:
e. Foreseeability .... there must be proof that the defendant [in
this case the volunteer coach] should have been able to predict
the possibility of an injury under the circumstances in question. It
is not necessary to show that the specific injury suffered by the
plaintiff was predictable under the circumstances; simply that a
reasonable person should have realized that someone might suffer
some type of injury.3
With the traditional formula for determining negligence in place, one
can begin to see how one errant and unintentionally thrown pitch can
result in a parent scrambling to call a lawyer, seeking to sue anyone and
everyone with a "close causal connection" to the child's injury.32 But,
29. Terry, supra note 18, at 41. Therefore, a determination needs to be made in under-
standing the conduct of the volunteer recreational coach; did the volunteer coach recognize
that there was a "risk" because of the nature of the activity he was coaching (an inherent risk
that an injury will be endured), or did the volunteer coach have knowledge of a specific risk,
but was not compelled to take the proper precautions to prevent injury?
30. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, § 30, at 164-65; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 281 & cmt. a. (1977) ("Clauses (a) and (b) state the conditions necessary to
make the actor's conduct negligent. Clauses (c) and (d) state the conditions which are neces-
sary to make negligent conduct actionable."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 &
cmt. b. (1977) (the reasonable man recognizes that his conduct involves risk of harm, and a
potential holding that his conduct amounted to negligence).
31. NEIL i. DOUGHERTY, ET AL., supra note 26, at 237; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 284 (1977).
32. "With thousands of nine-year-old rifle arms throwing thousands of baseballs as
thousands of Little League parents look on, the likelihood of an errant throw is obvious. It's
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not every mishap should result in a phone call to a lawyer, especially
when the determination of liability lies within the context of children
participating in recreational sports. For in the recreational sports arena,
every occurrence (the obvious and non-obvious) can be characterized as
"foreseeable."33 The volunteer coach is arguably always in "reasonably
close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury."
Thus, under the traditional negligence framework, there is always the
possibility that an affirmative answer can be given to the question: "Was
the [volunteer coach] under a duty to protect the [player(s)] against the
event which did in fact occur?"34
In the recreational sports context, a legislated willful and wanton
standard is best suited for addressing the concerns of individuals who are
willing to volunteer in their communities' recreational leagues. This con-
clusion is fostered through the use of two rationales. Initially, legislation
laying out a willful and wanton standard will address the fears of volun-
teers who are unwilling to face the uncertainties presented by the legal
system. There is uncertainty because there is no set formula in place that
will enable the correct and just outcome to prevail. A party to such an
action solely relies upon a group of individuals, serving in a jury capacity,
to competently make an understanding of the facts and the law of negli-
gence. But, in addition, one must recognize that when in the hands of a
creative legal mind, (who will later be speaking before a jury) nothing is
unforeseeable.
Secondly, the need for such legislation arises out of the desire to pro-
tect the community recreational programs that rely upon individual par-
sad, but emblematic of our times, that such an incident results in litigation." The Windup, the
Pitch, the Suit, SPoRTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 15, 1996, at 31 (Scorecard).
33. See, e.g., supra note 3; see also Castro v. Chicago Park District, 533 N.E.2d 504 (Ill.
App. 1988) (little leaguer brought negligence action against park district for injuries sustained
when hit by a foul ball, during a baseball game, while sitting on dugout bench; the team's
baseball coach was named in a third-party complaint for contributory negligence); Preston,
Pro Ami v. Little League Baseball Inc. & Pasadena Pan American Little League, 1994 WL
127847 (LRP Jury) ("[Little leaguer] suffered a fractured jaw and lacerations... [running]
into a barbed fence at the defendant's baseball field while chasing a ball which had been hit by
his coach."); Roe, Pro Ami v. Little League Baseball Inc. and Warwick Little League, 1995 WL
838253 (LRP Jury) (An 11-year-old ballplayer who was hit in the eye by a baseball while
playing (resulting in surgery and a change in vision), contended that the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to attach face shields to the helmets used during ball games); Baker v. Groetz,
1992 WL 330269 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1992) (parents brought negligence action on behalf of
their son for a team miniature golf outing incident involving a teammate's errant golf swing;
the team's baseball coach was also named as a negligent party in the suit).
34. PROSSER AND KEnTON, supra note 1, § 42, at 274 (emphasis added); Id. at 356 (for
volunteer coaches, that duty can be seen as an obligation to conform to a "legal standard of
reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk").
1997]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
ticipation on a voluntary basis. In fact, if these recreational programs
sought to hire only highly skilled and trained coaches there would be no
reason to write this article.
This article has no concern for any of the legal dilemmas that may
develop in the area of compensated sports coaches and instructors.3 5
There is a fundamental difference between the compensated coach and
the volunteer coach: absolutely everyone is capable of becoming a vol-
unteer coach, while only a small minority of individuals will ever be pro-
vided with the chance of becoming a compensated coach. Universality is
what makes community recreational sports so precious and worthy of
specific legal attention. Recreational athletics can accommodate anyone
who wishes to get involved.
Consider two cases, both on point with the aforementioned observa-
tions. Both cases present the issue of when does a particular coach's
conduct amount to negligence. In considering the cases, keep in mind
two variations: first, both cases should be treated as if the volunteer
coaches coached players between the ages of ten and eleven;36 and sec-
ond, how would these cases be determined under a willful and wanton
negligence standard?
In Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District,37 a high
school football coach was accused of exhibiting negligent conduct, result-
ing in one of his players sustaining injury.38 The injured football player,
sixteen years old, incurred permanent eye damage when struck by a fel-
low teammate's outstretched hand during a practice.3 9 The practice,
which did not include the use of protective equipment, took the form of
a game entitled "jungle football."40 "Jungle football" was defined in the
lawsuit, in part, as a fast-paced game where "[p]lay was stopped when
35. Here, the author is directly referring to high school and college level coaches, as well
as to instructors involved in various athletic activities (i.e., the martial arts, skiing, horseback
riding). For a broad exploration of coaches and the legal liability they face, at all levels of
competition, see generally McCaskey and Biedzynski, supra note 21, at 10 n.4.
The legal liability issue invariably pertains more to coaches on the amateur level for
obvious reasons. First, those coaches are not dealing with professional players who
tend to be older, more skilled, and more experienced than their amateur counterparts.
Second, professionals are paid athletes and are usually insured for resulting injuries
pertaining to the sport by their respective franchises.
Id.
36. Actually, the first case questioned the conduct of a high school football coach, while
the second case considered the actions of a volunteer little league baseball coach.
37. 437 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1981).
38. Id. at 1200.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1201.
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the ball carrier was tagged with two hands, or tackled, or when a pass fell
incomplete."'" The lower court ruled that the minor, Howard Rutter,
had assumed the risk of sustaining such an injury and that a claim for
negligence was inappropriate against the coach.4 2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded back to
the Beaver County Court announcing that: 1) Pennsylvania's courts
would no longer recognize the assumption of risk doctrine; and, 2) the
facts of the case should have been evaluated under a negligence
rationale.43
However, based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's characteri-
zation of the coach's conduct, a willful and wanton negligence" standard
would have been the appropriate liability rationale:
[A] 'touch' football game in which tackling and body blocking oc-
curs, which is initiated and supervised by the football coaches, in
which no equipment is used, and which is played by team mem-
bers attempting to impress coaches who are themselves engaged in
the game, may be said at least to present a jury question as to the
dangerousness of the game and the negligence of the coaches.45
If a volunteer coach and his players were the participants in Rutter,
would the nature of the activity and the conduct of the coach justify the
application of a willful and wanton negligence standard? And would the
application of this standard prove to be the most appropriate? It ap-
pears that this is so, especially when one considers that the coach, re-
gardless of his experience, must have been aware of the unreasonable
risks imposed by such an activity.
Would the reasonable person conduct an activity where no protective
equipment is issued, knowing that the game provided its participants
with the opportunity to impress their coach? Collectively, the facts
would suggest that the participants' level of competitiveness would have
been intensified. A volunteer coach's duty of care should not be
founded upon the foreseeability of an errant outstretched hand causing
permanent eye damage. Instead, one should be examining the coach's
41. Id.
42. Rutter, 437 A.2d at 1201.
43. Id. at 1209.
44. "[A f]ailure to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to a person who is actually
known to be, or reasonably is expected to be, within range of a known danger." BLACK'S,
supra note 1, at 1600.
45. Rutter, 437 A.2d at 1202 (emphasis added).
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level of willfulness or disregard to the known risks involved with con-
ducting the particular activity.46
The second case to be considered is Lasseigne v. American Legion,
Nicholson Post #38: a case decided in 1990 by the Court of Appeals in
Louisiana. 47 Jason Lasseigne, a minor, participated in the American Le-
gion little league baseball program, where his baseball coaches were vol-
unteer parents. On June 3, 1986, Jason, and his teammates, participated
in a practice session, after their regularly scheduled game had been post-
poned.48 The field they practiced on was wet and Jason, while taking
infield practice, was struck on the head by an errantly thrown baseball
by teammate Todd Landry.49 The wet ball field was responsible for pro-
ducing poor footing and a soggy baseball, resulting in Landry slipping on
the wet ground while making the throw.50 The volunteer coach immedi-
ately examined Jason and saw no apparent signs of injury. Nonetheless,
the volunteer coach instructed Jason to sit on the side for awhile to rest.
After a short period of time, Jason stated that he was ready to resume
practicing (at no time were there any signs of physical complications).51
Upon taking Jason home, his baseball coach told Jason to inform his
parents of what had happened during the practice. Approximately
twenty-four hours later, Jason underwent head surgery.52
The Lasseignes, on behalf of Jason, filed a suit for damages suffered.
An exhaustive list of responsible parties was compiled - a list that in-
46. Can a claim alleging negligence on behalf of the volunteer coach, for the permanent
eye damage sustained by a young little leaguer struck by a routine fly ball, be distinguished
from the facts asserted in Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County Sch. Dis.? Would the reason-
able person conclude that both incidents involved foreseeable risks that could have been pre-
vented by the coach's instruction or taking a different course of action? The two incidents
cannot be considered in the same light. Regardless of the level of coaching experience, the
parameters of the particular activity must be reasonably assessed prior to encouraging young-
sters to compete. However, one cannot create the expectation that every mishap incurred by
a youngster could have been avoided by some course of action taken by the coach. If that
were the case, every occurrence (even if it had only a one in one billion chance of occurring)
could be deemed as foreseeable, and reduced to a lawsuit alleging ordinary or mere
negligence.
If being struck in the eye by a routine fly ball is a foreseeable occurrence, created by a
volunteer coach's ordinary negligence, why are there not any aspiring lawyers trying to bar or
discontinue the activity?
47. Lasseigne v. American Legion, Nicholson Post #38, 558 So.2d 614 (La. Ct. App. 1990).




52. Lasseigne, 558 So.2d at 615.
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cluded Jason's baseball coaches.53 The conduct of Jason's coaches,
Claude Cassels and Billy Johnson, was specifically in question on appeal.
It was claimed that the coaches failed to adequately supervise the prac-
tice session and that they increased the severity of Jason's injury by not
directly informing his parents of the incident. 4
The focus of the case was whether the coaches breached their duty of
care: due to the conditions of the baseball field and allowing Jason to
resume practicing. But, could not the suit's focus just as easily have been
placed upon the parents? In an attempt to stay clear of any placed
blame, the parents claimed that "no one from Post 38 or the coaching
staff ever informed [them] that there was any undue risk involved in al-
lowing Jason to participate in the program."55 But, like any sports activ-
ity, there is always going to be the risk of injury (and is not that the
message behind the introduction of a willful and wanton negligence
standard).
In affirming the trial court's granting of summary judgment on behalf
of the defendants, the Louisiana Court of Appeals stated: "The reasona-
bleness of their conduct is especially clear in light of the social utility of
said conduct - namely, the value of the services of volunteers in a youth
sports program to the community in which they participate."56
Was the volunteer coach in Lasseigne negligent? The answer to that
question can arguably be answered in the affirmative, as it is reasonably
foreseeable that playing baseball on a wet grass field could result in a
player getting hurt. However, is this to mean that we should ignore the
role of the child's parents in this incident? The "team's regularly sched-
uled game was rained out,"57 yet the child's parents did not object to
their son's participation in the inclement weather. Could it be inferred
that the reasonable parent would not have allowed his/her child to par-
ticipate in such inclement conditions? It is possible to infer this (espe-
cially when taking into account the parents' knowledge of the activity's
53. Id. (parties also named in the suit included: American Legion, Nicholson Post #38;
the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (controller of Central Middle School practice
grounds); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (insurer of Cassels and Johnson under two sepa-
rate policies); Mr. and Mrs. Jerry Landry (parents of Todd Landry); and Gulf Insurance Com-
pany (insurer of Mr. and Mrs. Landry)).
54. Id. at 616.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 617 (emphasis added); see also Lasseigne v. American Legion, Nicholson Post
#38, 543 So.2d 1111 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (affirming the granting of American Legion's
motion for summary judgment).
57. Lasseigne, 558 So.2d at 615.
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risks and that their son's coach was potentially no more experienced in
precautionary measures associated with the activity than they were).
The facts presented in Lasseigne, unlike the facts in Rutter, do not
support a conclusion that the volunteer coach acted with willfulness or
conscious indifference. It must be acknowledged that an injury resulted
to one of the players. However, contrary to the conduct taken by the
coaches in Rutter, the coach's conduct exhibited in Lasseigne was clearly
within the scope of care associated with the reasonable "parent little
league baseball" person.
I believe that the context in which "social utility" was used, by the
judge, in Lasseigne, strongly supports the rationale behind legislating a
willful and wanton negligence standard. And, with that belief, Lasseigne
uncovers an additional element to be considered within the traditional
framework: How much is the social utility of a volunteer coach worth to
a society's community athletic programs?58
Judge Learned Hand, in a 1947 opinion, set out a mathematical equa-
tion for determining when an injury is the result of negligent conduct.
The equation relies upon the product of the equation's elements and
provides as follows:
[T]he owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the result-
ing injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions....
in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L;
and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.59
58. Depending upon how much one thinks the social utility is worth, one will either: a)
support a sanction that holds the volunteer coach's conduct to a higher degree of culpability;
b) recognize that the coach's conduct is to be weighed against the traditional framework for
negligence; or c) recognize that the monetary cost for uncompensated volunteer coaches is
economically inefficient, signifying the end of their utility. A conclusion that volunteer coach-
ing is economically inefficient is the result of recognizing that an ordinary negligence standard
is responsible for producing both preventative and legal costs that exceed the benefits of run-
ning a recreational athletic program.
59. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947). However,
Carroll Towing was not the first time Judge Learned Hand announced his test for determining
the unreasonableness of an act using the formula. See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612
(2nd Cir. 1940) ("the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness
of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid
the risk.").
The longevity of the Hand formula can be seen with its application in more recent cases,
thereby demonstrating the test's utility. See, e.g., Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch, Co.,
843 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992); Levi v. Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Cooperative
(SLEMCO), 542 So.2d 1081 (La. 1989).
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Now a distinguished opinion for approaching the calculation of negli-
gence within an economic framework, Judge Hand's intention was not to
be original. Judge Hand was acknowledging "the social function of lia-
bility for negligent acts."60 As a result, the economic impact, associated
with providing for community recreational programs, will influence the
decision as to what degree of culpability the volunteer coach's conduct
should be measured against. And, although legal scholars have provided
a wealth of economic analysis,6 ' this article's economic focus is whether
it is economically efficient to maintain recreational leagues if its volun-
teers are going to be held to an ordinary negligence standard.
Economic efficiency is achieved when the optimal level of precaution
is determined, which is the result of balancing the amount of money
spent in precaution against the probability, or risk, that harm will oc-
cur.62 Thus, if the costs of providing for safety equipment, coaching in-
struction, and first aid training exceed the benefits associated with
accident avoidance gained, society's communities would be better off,
economically speaking, to simply eliminate such recreational leagues.63
However, the economic efficiency of community recreational leagues
does not provide a conclusive assessment of whether such leagues should
exist. Any assessment of community recreational leagues must also ac-
knowledge the value of these leagues' social utility. When the social util-
ity of these leagues is accurately depicted, it becomes clear that a liability
scheme other than ordinary negligence must be established.
The costs of providing precaution will decrease with the legislating of
a willful and wanton negligence scheme. Whereupon, the injuries sus-
tained by child participants will have to be viewed as either the result of
participating in an activity that generates a risk of harm, or the result of
60. Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 32 (1972). "The cost of
prevention is what Hand meant by the burden of taking precautions against the accident. It
may be the cost of installing safety equipment or otherwise making the activity safer, or the
benefit forgone by curtailing... the activity." Id., quoted in Levi, 542 So.2d at 1087.
61. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 60; Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability
in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851 (1981) (including a historical discussion of the law
and economics movement); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence,
92 YALE L. J. 799 (1983); Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L. J. 862 (1983);
Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the Reasonable Person
to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 GEo L. J. 241
(1989); see also Guroo CALABRESI, THE Coss OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYsis (1970) (the normative theory to the economic approach).
62. Grady, supra note 61, at 801-03.
63. Posner, supra note 60, at 32-33.
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parents not taking the proper steps to ensure their own child's safety.
Adopting a willful and wanton negligence standard, at the expense of an
ordinary negligence standard, represents a willingness to accept the
premise that the level for risk of harm tolerated in a particular athletic
activity may increase. But, that potential increase in accident occurrence
is economically outweighed by the higher social values recognized when
providing children with the opportunity to participate in recreational
athletic leagues. Lastly, this rationale should not be viewed as any less
acceptable than the majority of jurisdictions that have announced a reck-
less disregard standard for co-participants who participate in the same
athletic activities.
B. Sports Co-Participants: A Unique Area Of The Law That Is
Relevant In Establishing and Supporting The Appropriate
Standard For Volunteer Coaches Involved With
Recreational Athletics
While most discussions of negligence (and the application of its ele-
ments) are directed toward events and circumstances most commonly
associated with everyday living, society's legal system has demonstrated,
over time, an unwillingness to be static in its ability to reconcile the un-
conventional event. The unwillingness to stagnate is especially apparent
where a traditional negligence analysis may fall short of providing an
aggrieved party with the most equitable result. This scenario is seen no
clearer than in the recreational sports arena: where the acts and emo-
tions of competitive athletic participants can sometimes generate unu-
sual events and circumstances giving rise to injury and misfortune.6'
64. Richard Laliberte, Baseball Dangers: What Every Parent Needs To Know, PARENTS
MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 1995, at 32,
With approximately 4.8 million kids between the ages of 5 and 14 stepping up to home
plate every year, it's no surprise that baseball and softball are two of the country's most
popular youth sports.... And each year, 107,000 injuries requiring visits to hospitals'
emergency rooms affect youngsters in youth baseball and softball leagues.
In addition, consider the following language from the 1939 case Englehardt v. Philipps, involv-
ing an eleven year old boy who experienced a swimming mishap:
Generally speaking, it may be assumed that a person of whatever age is able to appreci-
ate the obvious risks incident to any sport or activity in which he may be able to engage
with intelligence and proficiency and must act accordingly. If a child is able to play
baseball capably, he must know that there is a danger of being hit with a ball or bat; if
he is able to engage proficiently in the game of football, he must know that in playing
the game there will occur violent physical contacts which may result in injury to him; if
he is a proficient swimmer or diver, he must know of the danger of drowning and the
danger of harm incidental to the use of diving apparatus.
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In fact, the majority of jurisdictions, after wrestling with the issue,
have either legislated or judicially established a "reckless disregard of
safety"65 standard as the appropriate standard of care to be applied in
cases involving sports co-participants.66 The primary rationale, that lies
behind this majority standard, is the jurisdictions' desire to balance the
need to support and advance sports participants' nature to compete at an
Englehardt v. Philipps, 23 N.E.2d 829, 833 (Ohio St. 1939); but see Cople III, supra note 6, at
S17,779. William J. Cople III states:
The courts have regrettably found rights, and corresponding remedies, to exist in cases
involving grievances that are trivial or mundane and in cases where acts or omissions
were not previously understood to be a legal wrong. In other cases, judges and juries
have found serious injuries and other matters of grave concern to deserve recompense,
even though the legal duty was uncertain or the causal connection to the harm was
attenuated.
Id.
65. RE STATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1977) (defining "reckless disregard of
safety"); see also Dotzler, 449 N.W.2d at 782 ("[R]ecklessness exists where a person knows
that the act is harmful but fails to realize that it will produce the extreme harm which it did
produce."). A determination that an action should claim "reckless disregard" over a claim of
ordinary negligence rests in the ability to recognize that unrelated activity produces specific
conduct with a concurring level of risk. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, at 213. Yet,
"[r]ecklessness differs from intentional wrongdoing [(i.e., willful and wanton negligence)] in
that while the act must be intended by the actor in order to be considered reckless, the actor
does not intend to cause the harm which results from the act." Dotzler, 449 N.W.2d at 782; see
also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 1, at 211-15.
66. See generally Mel Narol, Sports Participation With Limited Litigation: The Emerging
Reckless Disregard Standard, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 29 (1991) ("Courts and legislatures
have espoused the view that torts which might be actionable in other areas if negligence is
shown, should only be actionable in the sports arena if the aggrieved person demonstrates
gross negligence or reckless disregard by the defendant."); see also Knight, 834 P.2d at 710-11
(improper for participants to be held against an ordinary careless conduct standard, as co-
participants only assume the risk of ordinary negligence; reckless or wanton infliction of injury
is actionable); Ginsberg v. Hontas, 545 So.2d 1154 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (duty to refrain from
reckless conduct); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Mass. 1989) ("We hold that participants
in an athletic event owe a duty to other participants to refrain from reckless misconduct");
Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982) (liability for an injury incurred during slow pitch
softball game must be predicated on reckless disregard of safety principles rather than a mere
negligence standard); Dotzler, 449 N.W.2d at 774 (participants will not be held liable for ordi-
nary negligence but will be held liable for conduct that is reckless); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559
N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990) (the proper standard for adult and child participants involved in rec-
reational sports activities is that of recklessness); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M.
1983) (for a player to recover damages for an injury sustained at the hands of an opponent, it
must be shown that the opponent acted with a reckless disregard for the rules); Connell v.
Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (in competitive contact sports for a plaintiff to
prevail he/she must be able to demonstrate that the defendant had acted "recklessly"); Lestina
v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993) (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (asserting
that a recklessness standard is more appropriate than an ordinary negligence standard, as the
latter standard would discourage vigorous participation).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
aggressive level with the co-participant's right of redress for injuries
incurred.67
Acknowledging that an ordinary or mere negligence standard is inad-
equate in an area of society that promotes vigorous athletic competition,
an examination of the first jurisdiction to adopt the reckless disregard
standard is in order. In 1975, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a
participant is legally liable for conduct that is either deliberate, willful, or
with reckless disregard for the safety of the other participating players.68
In Nabozny, both the plaintiff, playing the position of goalkeeper, and
the defendant, playing forward on the opposing team, participated in a
high school soccer game.6 9 The plaintiff, while down on one knee to
field the ball in the "penalty area," was kicked in the side of the head by
the defendant.7 ° Witnesses stated that the contact could have been
avoided and that the soccer rules explicitly prohibited any player from
making contact with the goalkeeper when in possession of the ball in the
"penalty area."71 The court emphasized that for conduct to be regarded
as reckless, facts such as the training and coaching of the teams, the es-
tablished rules of the sport, the defendant's actions in relation to the
safety rules, and the level of competition (i.e., did the incident occur dur-
ing "heated play") all had to be considered.72
Although the Nabozny opinion has been pointed to as a starting
point in establishing the reckless disregard standard, there has been an
apparent struggle with formulating a consistent interpretation and appli-
cation of the standard by jurisdictions' courts and legislatures. 73 This in-
ability to cite a fixed reckless disregard standard may explain why there
are still states and commentators who believe that the standard is inap-
67. This all originates out of the failure by someone to keep his or her conduct within the
scope of the particular athletic contest. See Narol, supra note 66.
68. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
69. Id. at 259.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 260.
72. Id. (the jury had to decide whether Barnhill's conduct was a "part of the game").
73. Bumstein, supra note 19, at 1014 (illustrating inconsistencies by contrasting the defini-
tions of "reckless disregard," announced in Bourque v. Duplechin, Nabozny v. Barnhill, and
Kabella v. Bouschelle); see also Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d at 95 (once establishing that reckless disre-
gard for the safety of others was the proper standard, the next issue the court needed to
resolve was what type of conduct actually constituted recklessness); Lynn A. Goldstein, Note,
Participant's Liability for Injury to a Fellow Participant in an Organized Athletic Event, 53
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 97, 98 (1976) (contending that the Nabozny v. Barnhill holding is vague,
resulting in misplaced determinations of when a player's conduct constitutes a reckless
disregard).
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propriate. Instead, they opt for the adoption of an ordinary negligence
standard.74
These problems, associated with interpreting and applying the "reck-
less disregard of safety" standard, are possible reasons why volunteer
coaches have been targeted as potentially liable parties. Whether it be a
result of the law's evolution or society's persistence in trying to place
accountability on every mishap, volunteer coaches being held accounta-
ble for injuries sustained by players is just a result of finding someone
else to blame.75
C. The Willful And Wanton Negligence Standard Can Curb The
Trend Of Shifting The Blame To The Volunteer Recreational
Coach For The Injuries Incurred By Children
Participating In Recreational
Athletic Activities
One should never advocate the position that volunteer coaches, in
the recreational sports arena, are not to be held to some level of care.
At the same time, one should not maintain the position that would hold
volunteer coaches accountable for every incident that could fit within the
black letter definition of ordinary negligence.7 6 As William J. Cople III
has stated in his article entitled Unfair Lawsuits Threaten Volunteers:
Any parent entrusting their children to the care and supervision
of another should expect and demand that all reasonable and pru-
dent care be taken in discharging that responsibility. However,
this does not mean that only constant supervision of the youth in
their care, regardless of the age and other factors, will suffice for
volunteers to satisfy their legal responsibility. Certainly, the cir-
cumstances surrounding tragic incidents should be carefully ex-
amined. . . . But circumstances will nonetheless occur where
senseless tragedies happen without anyone being legally to
blame.... Organizations serving the youth in our community...
74. See, e.g., Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737,741 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (participants
assume the risks of injury in athletic events, but that does not mean that actionable negligence
cannot occur on the playing field); Lestina, 501 N.W.2d at 29 (the rules of ordinary negligence
govern liability for injuries sustained during recreational contact sports); Crawn v. Campo, 630
A.2d 368,375-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (simple negligence, not reckless disregard, is
the standard owed by individuals participating in sports activities); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts &
Sports: Participant Liability to Co-participants for Injuries Sustained During Competition, 7 U.
MArvn ENzr. & SPORTS L. Rnv. 191,213-14 (1990) (the reckless disregard standard is inappro-
priate within the context of contact sports where intent to harm is inherent).
75. See, e.g., supra note 6.
76. Levi, 542 So.2d at 1086, ("the ordinary reasonable person ... is required to realize
that there will be a certain amount of negligence in the world").
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should not be forced into the role of guaranteeing a safe harbor
free of all risk. [N]either should volunteers be held to a standard
that may be infeasible, or even unattainable.77
Clearly, in the context of this area, establishing a mere negligence stan-
dard is too low a burden of proof.78 The thought that both the judiciary
and legislature would expose community volunteers to potentially end-
less claims of liability does not make sense, especially when faced with
the broader realization that those young sports participants need athletic
facilitators.79 The imposition of a willful and wanton negligence stan-
dard will immunize those individuals, who in certain situations, would
potentially be found to have acted negligently. But, at the same time,
reducing the scope of liability will advance the social function of ensur-
ing that there is not a shortage of athletic facilitators (i.e., community
volunteers willing to coach recreational sports). Thus, in advancing a
willful and wanton negligence standard, as the appropriate standard for
measuring a recreational volunteer coach's conduct, two principles must
77. Cople III, supra note 6, at S17,780.
78. If Good Samaritan laws - generally declaring volunteer rescuers negligent when
their actions have increased the severity of a person's injury - hold the volunteer rescuer to a
potentially stringent standard, then it is inappropriate to conclude that the volunteer coach
should be held to a less stringent standard. See Brown, supra note 11, at 38.
This argument can be reconciled by recognizing that legislators ultimately face the task of
balancing social policy. The conclusion that volunteer recreational league coaches should be
evaluated under the same liability scheme as Good Samaritans assumes that public opinion
voices the same concerns for each type of volunteer. This would seem unfounded, especially
when one considers that a balancing of'public policy produces different levels of care for
volunteers who possess different levels of medical or rescue related skill and training. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE AN. § 17-95-108 (Michie 1995) (retired physicians providing volunteer med-
ical assistance will be held liable for acts amounting to willful misconduct); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 49409 (West 1994) (physicians rendering, in good faith, voluntary medical assistance at ele-
mentary or secondary school athletic events will only be held liable for grossly negligent acts
or omissions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.135 (West 1995) (volunteer elementary and secondary
school team physicians must render emergency care as would be performed by the reasonably
prudent person with similar skills and training); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-25-38 (1995) (in a
charitable capacity, physicians providng medical or health services must not act willfully or
grossly negligent); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.231 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (athletic team
physicians, who volunteer their services, will be held liable for acts constituting willful and
wanton misconduct); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-140-509 (1995) (physician "on the scene" shall
be held to that level of care expected from the reasonable physician exercising such skill and
ability).
79. Cople III, supra note 6, at S17,780.
The civil justice system should not recognize a legal right for every victim of circum-
stances. The rule of law should be used to define our standards of conduct and pro-
mote consistency and reasonable expectations in their application .... Despite the best
of intentions, when misused or used in unpredictable ways, the civil justice system ends
up serving no one, least of all those who volunteer.
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be asserted: 1) in the modern era, the legal system's use (or threatened
use) is directly opposed to any theory calling for economic efficiency;
and, 2) participation is usually the result of creating incentives and if a
liability rule cannot foster an economic incentive it must then offer a
social incentive.
The willful and wanton negligence standard should be statutorily leg-
islated and judicially applied. Codifying this standard into state statutes
appears to be the best way to formulate its interpretation and applica-
tion.8" Legislators, responsible for drafting statutory language, directly
in touch with modern society, possess the ability to foresee changes in
public opinion and recognize the complexity of societal needs. In short,
legislators are the best suited for setting out a plan for legal order in the
recreational leagues. 81 However, this does not overlook the critical role
that the judiciary has to play in determining whether the volunteer coach
is to be held liable in a particular situation. Even with the most soundly
drafted statutes at their disposal, people still rely on the judge's ability to
provide legal insight and justice.8z
There is support for a common law determination to be made in
cases involving the mishaps of children participating in recreational
sports. But, the actual development of such community recreational
leagues is the product of collective determinations. Therefore, it would
seem appropriate that those who participated in those leagues' develop-
ment should also have an influence over the way they are to be gov-
erned. Part IV of this article illustrates that there are several states that
have gone forward with this approach even though a great number of
states do not.
But, first the individual that this tort law controversy is focused
around must be examined - the community volunteer.
80. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 4 (1982) ("In the country's
experience statute law has had special importance in giving content to public policy and adapt-
ing the legal social order to changing currents of interest and circumstances."); but see GuIDo
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (who argues against the
utility of statutes, as courts are faced with the problem of having to interpret and apply stat-
utes that are obsolete or that take no note of time).
81. See Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L. J. 862, 885 (1983) (statutory law
has been responsible for replacing "reckless common law;" it would appear that legislators
have surpassed judges in creating laws for almost every area in modem society); see also Dr.
Oskar Bulow, Statutory Law and the Judicial Function, 34 Am. J. LEGAL HIs. 71, 74-5 (1995)
(translation by James E. Herget and Ingrid Wade); but see xCrICaRD POSNER, ECONOUC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 404 (2d ed. 1977) ("judge made rules tend to be efficiency promoting"); F.
HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 94-144 (1973) (an argument based on non-economic
grounds, producing criticism that legislation is inferior to the common law).
82. Bulow, supra note 81, at 94.
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II. VOLUNTEERISM: AN INSTITUTION APPRECIATED By SocmfTY's
COMMUNITIES, BUT ARE ITS INDIVIDUALS APPRECIATED
ENOUGH To BE PROTECTED FROM THE
INEQUITIES OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM?
Several individuals in the political arena have stated that: Volunteers
are the backbone of American society. 3 However, before weighing that
statement's validity, consider the statistical data compiled by Independ-
ent Sector from a series of biennial surveys originating in 1988:84
Unit 1993 1991 1989
Volunteers, including informal volunteering mil. 89.2 94.2 98.4
Average weekly hours per volunteers hours 4.2 4.2 4.0
Estimated total of hours in both formal informal volunteering bil. 19.5 20.5 NA
The estimated value of volunteer time bil. $182 $176 ($150)85
Above average volunteering groups
35-44 years of age pct. 54.5 60.8 64.2
45-54 years of age pct. 53.8 55.9 56.4
Areas in which population volunteered (Volunteers as a pct. of
population) pct. (47.7) (51.1) (54.4)
Recreation (adults) pct. 5.4 6.7 8.5
Youth Development pct. 11.7 14.7 15.8
Realizing that volunteering has declined six percentage points since
1990,s6 one would have to question the merit of this section's opening
83. 135 CONG. REc. E1,049-02 (daily ed. April 4, 1989) (statement of the Honorable John
P. Murtha) ("The efforts of volunteers are really the backbone of our country."); see also 139
CONG. REc. H7,468-04, H7,487 (daily ed. October 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Fields) ("Vol-
unteers have been the backbone of this country."); U.S. Rep. John Porter, End the Liability of
Volunteering, CHIC. TRm., Aug. 24, 1986 (Perspective) ("Volunteers are the backbone of social
progress and community life in America and run many of our local governments from town-
ships to libraries to volunteer fire departments."); 142 CONG. REc. S2,081-01, 82,090 (daily ed.
Mar. 14, 1996) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("[W]e should not forget the 3.9 million young
people who do volunteer work in their community without compensation. These volunteers
help form the backbone of community service in America."); 139 CONG. REc. H4,531-01,
H4532 (daily ed. July 13, 1993) (statement of Rep. Michel) ("Only when millions of individual
volunteers in tens of thousands of America's communities tell Washington through their ac-
tions what community service is can we truly reflect the strength of this Nation . . ."); 135
CONG. REc. S2,257-03, S2,258 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Deconcini) ("From
town councils and charitable organizations to little league baseball teams and scout troops,
America depends on volunteers."); 134 CONG. REc. S301-02 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988) (state-
ment of Sen. Melcher) ("This country was built by volunteers, and it's volunteers who make it
work today."); 133 CONG. Rnc. S4,719-02 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1987) (statement of Sen. Melcher)
("Our country depends on volunteers to make things work: Town councils, libraries, school
boards, fire departments, hospital boards, Scout troops and little league teams.")
84. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, AMERICA'S INDEPENDENT SECTOR IN BRIEF (Wmter 1996).
85. Eric Pfanner, Grassley to Sponsor Bill to Insure Some Volunteers, OMAHA WoRLD-
HERALD, June 1, 1990, at 17 (relying on 1988 figures, Senator Grassley stated that the value of
volunteers' time was estimated at $150 billion).
86. POINTS OF LIGHT FOUNDATION, A MEASURE OF CoMMrITmNT (Fall 1994).
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statement. In fact, beginning in the later half of the 1980s, the backbone
of America has plunged into a downward spiral. Volunteering has ap-
parently lost nearly ten million people from its order.
The statistical data casts doubt on the premise that volunteers are the
backbone of America, but the statistical data is not irrefutable. First,
consider the statements made on the Congressional floor proclaiming:
"[V]olunteer service has become a high-risk venture. Our 'sue happy'
legal culture has ensnared those selfless individuals who help worthy or-
ganizations and institutions through volunteer service. And, these law-
suits are proof that no good deed goes unpunished."'  The statements
originating from non-profit organizations echo the same realization, that
individuals are forgoing the opportunity to volunteer due to the prospect
of facing potential litigation:
It's [(the litigation explosion)] a problem common to all nonprofit
organizations and the volunteers they depend on. Little League
Baseball has seen its liability insurance skyrocket 1,000% - from
$75 per league annually to $795 - in a recent five year period.
Good Samaritans are caught in a suicide squeeze .... [T]here is
growing evidence of a 'chilling effect' at work, as volunteers from
sports teams to fire and rescue units to candy stripers at the local
hospital learn that their altruism won't save them from a
subpoena.8
87. 141 CONG. REc. at S17,777 (statement of Sen. McConnell). Mr. McConnel's opening
statement was made in support of the Volunteer Protection Act: a bill that would create
immunity from lawsuits for responsible and duly certified volunteers. Id. (the Volunteer Pro-
tection Act is discussed further, infra text accompanying notes 92-95). See also 141 CONG.
REc. at S17,779 (William J. Copple III stated: "It is fair to say.. .that volunteers themselves
have become victims of the civil justice system. The increasing propensity to enlarge the uni-
verse of rights and award compensation, often in stunning amounts, may be to the detriment
of volunteer service."); 136 CONG. Rnc. S1,782-02, S1,784 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1990) (statement
of Sen. McConnell) ("'sue-for-a-million' mentality that has gripped our civil justice system");
Little League Bill Is Irresistible But Shortsighted, supra note 3, at 18 ("In our increasingly
litigious society, not even kids' baseball is immune from liability claims in court: A Central
Islip mother sued after she was creamed by a ball thrown past her daughter who was allegedly
covering first base. . ."); Pfanner, supra note 85, at 17 ("Referring to 'sue-happy' elements of
American society, [Sen.] Grassley said his bill would protect the 'venerable tradition of
volunteerism."'); Volunteering Firefighters Are Scarcer, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 19,
1994 (News) (J.D. Reeder, president of the Nebraska Volunteer Firefighters Association
stated: "Everybody is so sue-happy anymore, that (volunteers) are afraid that if they do
something wrong, they're going to lose everything they have.")
88. HALE, supra note 3. See also Robert Hanley, Insurance Costs Imperil Recreation In-
dustry, N.Y. TImEs, May 12, 1986, at Al ("In Queens, the Ozone Park Little League has been
barred from the field it leases from the New York Racing Association until it comes up with
$25 million in liability coverage[, an increase in coverage in the amount of $24 million].")
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Clearly, the statistics establish a trend that may lead one to conclude
that either: 1) as a social institution, volunteering is not as important as
it once was; or 2) individuals simply do not have the resources - namely
time without economic reward - that they once had available to them.
But, a belief in either conclusion will only lead one down the narrow
road of maintaining the status quo. The real cause for the statistical de-
cline in volunteerism can be attributed to the perception that we live in a
society whose legal system has become as uncontrollable as a tornado in
the Midwest. Individuals are afraid to volunteer because they are afraid
of being sued. If one thinks the fear is unwarranted, one need look no
further than what is being said in Congress," or to what is happening tothe size of jury awards.9°
89. 135 CONG. REc. S2,257-03, S2,258 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Decon-
cini) ("What is the cause of the decline in volunteers? One factor is a perception among
volunteers that they can be sued and potentially lose their homes, farms, and personal as-
sets."); 133 CONG. REn. S4,719-02 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1987) (statement of Sen. Melcher)
("[V]olunteers are getting harder to find. Why? Because volunteers are increasingly wary of
being exposed to lawsuits that is, being sued by someone who is injured.. ."); 136 CONG. REc.
S1,782-02, S1,785 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1990) (statement of Sen. McConnell) ("[P]eople in
America are not coming forward to offer their services because of the fear of being sued. Yet,
no other country on Earth depends more on volunteer efforts of so many throughout their
society."); 136 CoNG. REc. H7,521-02, H7,533 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Tauke) ("We are seeing greater and greater incidences of potential volunteers unwilling to
give their time in service for fear of being sued."); 137 CONG. REc. S8310-01, S8344 (daily ed.
June 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Deconcini) ("Many volunteers believe they may be the
subject of a lawsuit as a result of their volunteer activities .... Potential volunteers are not
getting involved, and nonprofit organizations are dropping valuable programs because of their
concern about litigation."); 139 CONG. Rnc. S9,938-01, S9,946 (daily ed. July 30, 1993) (state-
ment of Sen. McConnell) ("The message that millions of would-be volunteers are getting from
our legal system is this: Serve and be sued."); 1996 WL 81963 (F.D.C.H.) (Feb. 27, 1996)
(testimony of the Rep. John Edward Porter before the House Judiciary Committee).
[Tihe public perception of volunteering [is] a risky undertaking. Even though volun-
teers have not been sued successfully in large numbers, volunteers have been named in
many lawsuits and the costs of legal defense can be staggering. This fear of lawsuits has
affected volunteer programs nationwide by discouraging individuals from coming for-
ward to pledge their time for good causes.
Id.; see also 1996 WL 85879 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Sister Christine Bowman before the
House Judiciary Committee) (Feb. 28, 1996) ("[T]he perception of liability is a strong disin-
centive for many prospective volunteers."); but see 136 CONG. Rc. S1,782-02, 81,793 (daily
ed. Feb. 28, 1990) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) ("It [the premise that volunteer protection
legislation is needed] is based on what I believe is an absolute false premise; that is many
people are not volunteering because they are afraid of being sued.")
90. See Edward Felsenthal, Increase in Size of Jury Awards May Spur Efforts to Alter
System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at PG (Law),
The size of jury awards grew for the second year in a row, according to a new study...
The study by Jury Verdict Research, a Horsham, Pa. firm that tracks trials, found that
in 1995 the median amount awarded to compensate plaintiffs for injuries was .. . up
17% from.. .1994... The median awards.. .don't include punitive damages...;
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As a final thought, while testifying before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, United States Representative John Edward Porter concluded
that today's volunteers are forced to "weigh liability risks against their
desire to serve."'" But, this fear of liability (and potentially having to
face litigation) on the part of the volunteer coach could be reduced. The
introduction and subsequent enacting of statutory law in every state, es-
tablishing a willful and wanton negligence standard, would effectively
combat the volunteer coach's fear. This goal of nationwide uniformity is
supported by the belief that community athletic programs can only sur-
vive through the enactment of laws that value social utility as much as
they value the promotion of economic efficiency.
III. ADDRESSING THE PERCEPTION OF FEAR THROUGH THE
ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION: THE STATES, NOT THE
FEDERAL GovERNMENT, SHOULD BE PROTECTING
THE VOLUNTEER COACH.
The enactment of legislation is capable of placating the fears of po-
tential volunteers. However, this solution cannot be addressed before
resolving the initial matter of who should be responsible for enacting the
legislation; the individual states or the federal government through the
law-making abilities of Congress?
First, consider what has been proposed at the federal level. Begin-
ning in the late 1980s, Congress stepped forward in an attempt to rem-
see also 141 CONG. REc. H1,961-01, H1,966 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Heineman):
The greater majority of States have no standards or guidelines that juries or the courts
can use to determine the maximum possible award in a case. As a result, the fre-
quency, and more importantly, the size of punitive damage awards have increased
markedly in the past years. A Rand Corp. study found that in Cook County, IL, there
was a 2000 percent increase in punitive damage awards over a 20-year period. Perhaps
even more startling was the size of the awards. Over that same period, the average
punitive damage award increased from $7,000 to $729,000.
Id.; see also CHARLoTTE A. CARTER-YAMAUCHI, VoLUNTEERIsM - A RisKY BusINEss? 1
(1996) ("[T]he litigation explosion and excessive jury awards in damage cases have led to
concern about volunteer liability that persists even today."); David 0. Weber, A Thousand
Points of Fright?, INsuRANcE REvmw, Feb. 1, 1991, at 40 (describing an incident involving an
individual seriously injured, falling 90 feet, while climbing Box Springs Mountain. He then
sued his rescuers for "reckless and negligent" rescue techniques; in a lawsuit that was eventu-
ally dropped 2 years later, the injured climber sought $12 million in damages).
91. 1996 WL 81963 (F.D.C.H.); see also 142 CONG. REc. S2,553-04, S2,589 (daily ed. Mar.
21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) ("[A]s long as our litigation system forces a would-be
volunteer to consider whether the risks of being sued outweigh the benefits of contributing
one's time and talent to charitable organizations efforts to solve society's problems will con-
tinue to be unnecessarily stymied.")
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edy the problem of volunteers being susceptible to lawsuits alleging
negligence. Originating as far back as 1986, United States Representa-
tive John Edward Porter has continuously introduced House Bill 911
(entitled the Volunteer Protection Act). Although House Bill 911 has
reportedly received an ample amount of support,92 the bill has not ad-
vanced beyond the consideration of the House Judiciary Committee.93
In declaring that the prospect of being sued has deterred individuals
from volunteering,94 the bill's purpose is to prevent volunteers from "be-
ing forced to defend him or herself for liability action related to their
unpaid service to any not-for-profit organization." 95 Using House Bill
911 as a model, Congressman Porter's aim is to encourage each state to
enact legislation that would provide individual volunteers with immunity
92. 1996 WL 81963 (F.D.C.H.) (Representative Porter testifying that "the last four Con-
gresses [the bill] has enjoyed the bipartisan support of over 200 Members of Congress"); 1996
WL 107211 (F.D.C.H.) (John H. Graham, IV testifying on behalf of the A.S.A.E. that "more
than 150 Members have cosponsored the bill"); 1996 WL 90810 (F.D.C.H.) (Christine G.
Franklin testifying on behalf of the American Red Cross supporting H.R. 911's immunization
of individuals who volunteer).
93. According to Julie Debolt, a staff member for Congressman Porter, the bill's status as
of September 18, 1996. See, hifra note 97.
Additionally, Congressman Porter, in 1993, attempted to address volunteer liability expo-
sure by introducing an amendment to the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993,
but the House Judicial Committee elected to omit the provision from the final bill. See 139
CONG. REc. H6,318-02 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Porter):
The Judiciary Committee has, as I have stated on the floor previously, not held a hear-
ing on my legislation - H.R. 911, the Volunteer Protection Act - for 8 years despite
its hundreds of cosponsors and widespread support. Not surprisingly, they removed this
provision from the final legislation, a provision which would have strengthened, not
weakened this bill [(the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993)].
Id.; see also 139 CONG. REc. S9,938-01, S9,948 (dally ed. July 30, 1993) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini) (supporting an amendment, similar to the Volunteer Protection Act of 1993, to
the National Service Act that would provide volunteers protection from tort litigation).
President Clinton signed the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993 on Sep-
tember 21, 1993. See Remarks on Signing the National and Community Service Trust of 1993,
29 WEEKLY CoMP. Ppxs. Doc. 1822 (Sept. 27, 1993).
94. See generally H.R. 911, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.§2(A) (1995), "Findings. The Congress
finds and declares that ...").
95. 1996 WL 81963 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of the Honorable John Edward Porter before
the House Judiciary Committee on February 27, 1996). Section 2(B) of House Bill 911 states:
(B) Purpose - It is the purpose of this Act to promote the interests of social service
program beneficiaries and taxpayers and to sustain the availability of programs and
nonprofit organizations and governmental entities which depend on volunteer contri-
butions by encouraging reasonable reform of state laws to provide protection from
personal financial liability to volunteers serving with non-profit organizations and gov-
ernmental entities for actions undertaken in good faith on behalf of such organizations.
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from civil liability claims of ordinary or "simple negligence., 96 House
Bill 911 establishes an economic incentive in the form of a one percent
increase in Social Service Block Grants.97
Meanwhile, over this same time period, United States Senator Mitch
McConnell has introduced similar legislation with Senate Bill 1435, the
Volunteer Protection Act of 199528 Fundamentally, the bill's declara-
tion and findings are identical. 99 However, the two bills reflect the Con-
gressmen's different mindsets as to how to resolve the problem.100 The
Senate's legislation, affording protection to volunteers, takes the posi-
tion that it is a matter of concern to be governed by the Federal Govern-
ment. Thus, Senate Bill 1435 is not an attempt to encourage states to
adopt model legislation, but rather an attempt to preempt the states'
abilities to experiment and legislate for themselves. 10'
96. Id. However, volunteers who act grossly negligent or behave in a willful or wanton
manner are not protected. In addition, volunteer protection is not extended to volunteers
when they are operating any motor vehicle. See H.R. 911 (Section 4(A)-(D), "Limitation on
Liability for Volunteers").
97. Telephone Interview with Julie DeBolt, legislative aid for Rep. Porter (Sept. 18, 1996).
98. S. 1435, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Senator McConnell has been a long-time sup-
porter of legislation affording volunteer protection, as he has offered similar legislation in 1989
and 1993. See Government Press Releases, McConnell Introduces Volunteer Protection Act
(Nov. 29,1995); see also 136 CONG. REc. S1,782-02, S1,784 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1990) (statement
of Sen. McConnell) (introducing amendment 1269 to section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 affording protection from civil liability to volunteers, as well as discussing the
Lawsuit Reform Act); but see 133 CONG. REc. S4,719-02 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Melcher) (introducing S. 929, "Voluntary Protection Act of 1987," to the committee on
the Judiciary that would "encourage States to grant volunteers of tax-exempt organizations
immunity from personal civil authority for actions which they take in good faith and which are
within the scope of their official functions"); 135 CONG. REc. S2,257-03, S2,258 (daily ed. Mar.
7, 1989) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (introducing S. 520, a bill identical to H.R. 911, on
Feb. 7, 1989).
99. S. 1435, reprinted in 141 CONG. REc at S17,778 (statement of Sen. McConnell) ("Sec-
tion 2. Findings and Purpose"), compare with H.R. 911 ("Section 2. Findings and Purpose").
100. 1996 WL 90811 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell before the
House Judiciary Committee) (Feb. 28, 1996) (". . . while our proposals take different ap-
proaches, our goal is the same: to eliminate the lawsuit burden from the caring citizens who
give their time and service to their communities").
101. Compare S. 1435 and H.R. 911.
Section 3. Preemption.
"This Act preempts the laws of any State to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this
Act, except that this Act shall not preempt any State law that provides additional incentives or
protections to volunteers, or category of volunteers."
S. 1435 (emphasis added), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. at S17,778 (statement of Sen. McCon-
nell) (while introducing the bill Sen. McConnell stated that the Act would create a "Federal
standard for volunteer protection"); but see 135 CONG. REc. at S2,259 (statement of Sen.
DeConcini) (S. 520: "Section 3. No Preemption of State Tort Law").
Section 3. No Preemption of State Tort Law.
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In addition to the legislation introduced by Congress, the Bush Ad-
ministration developed the Model State Volunteer Service Protection
Act in 1990.102 Much like House Bill 911, the Model State Act was an
attempt at encouraging the states to enact comprehensive volunteer pro-
tection for those individuals donating their time with nonprofit organiza-
tions and governmental entities.10 3 Accordingly, the Model State Act's
protection extends to those volunteers who have acted in good faith (i.e.,
within the scope of their official duties) and where any injury which is
not the result of a willful or wanton disregard on the part of the
volunteer.'0 4
Through 1996, Congress's Volunteer Protection Act has never moved
beyond the House Judiciary Committee, and no state has adopted the
Model State Act in its entirety. 0 5 One of the reasons for this inaction
could be attributed to the fact that by the time of the Model State Act's
inception, "each state legislature had already addressed the matter at
least once, and few were eager to tackle it again."'0 6
Obviously, broad volunteer protection laws that encompass the many
types of volunteers and the different classes of organizations they are
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt the laws of any State governing tort liabil-
ity actions." H.R. 911.
However, it is interesting to point out that in 1993, while supporting an amendment (that
would provide immunity to volunteers of nonprofit organizations or governmental entities) to
the National and Community Service Trust Act, Senator McConnell stated: "[T]his amend-
ment is quite different from the approach I personally have taken in the past to the liability
issue. It does not preempt State tort law, as my proposals have in the past." 139 CONG. REc.
S9,938-01, S9,946 (daily ed. July 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
102. DEPr. OF JUSTICE, MODEL STATE VOLUNTEER PROTEMCON Acr AND COMMEN-
TARY (Dec. 1990), reprinted in CARTER-YAMAUCHi, supra note 90.
103. MODEL STATE VOLUNTEER PROTECITON Act AND COMMENTARY, supra note 102,
at § 4 (The Preamble of the Act establishes the same findings and declarations as H.R. 911
and S. 1435); see also 26 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 2031 (Dec. 12, 1990),
[N]o obstacle is more chilling than the fear of personal liability and the high cost of
insurance to protect against liability. Often programs are curtailed or those contem-
plated are not undertaken because of the fear of personal liability - outrageous claims
often about personal liability.... [The Model State Volunteer Service Protection Act]
encourages volunteers to contribute their services for the good of their communities."
104. MODEL STATE VOLUNTEER PROTECrTION Act AND COMMENTARY, supra note 102,
at § 5.
105. CARTER-YAMAUCHI, supra note 90, at ch. 6 and ch. 3 (chapter 3 discusses the many
state volunteer protection laws adopted, whose "actual scope of coverage" varies tremen-
dously from state to state); but see ALA. CODE § 6-5-336 (1991) (the Volunteer Service Act
follows - by incorporating identical language - the Model State Act save one major differ-
ence: The act actually affords more protection to volunteers by omitting the Model State
Act's exception of immunity for those volunteers who operate a motor vehicle).
106. Tremper, supra note 10, at 23.
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affiliated with, would resolve the problems faced by volunteer athletic
coaches. There are a few states that have enacted laws affording protec-
tion to a broad range of volunteers, but those laws attempt to be broadly
construed because they "usually focus on volunteers of nonprofit enti-
ties.' 10 7 Volunteer coaches associated with Little League Baseball, Inc.
or Pop Warner Football would be afforded protection, but volunteer
coaches who affiliate with a municipality or town recreation department
would not. Herein lies the problem, or shortcoming, with not having
specific statutory protection for all volunteer coaches.
It is the legislators of the individual states who have to recognize the
need to protect volunteer athletic coaches, but they also must be com-
mitted to taking the appropriate legislative measures. Undeniably, the
legislation endorsed at the federal level has identified the problem and
would provide a benefit to society by: 1) solidifying the importance and
value of volunteers in our society; and 2) addressing society's animosity
toward the legal system's tolerance for frivolous lawsuits. Nonetheless,
enacting such legislation should still be left for the states to address.
The states have traditionally been left on their own to enact and reg-
ulate laws that would be in the best interests of their respective citi-
zens.'08 In addressing the preemptive effects of federal reform, and the
issue of whether the states or federal government should be reforming
the tort system, Thomas A. Eaton and Susette M. Talarico commented:
One consequence of state control of tort law has been variation
and experimentation. Each state has been free to decide for itself
what mix of doctrine best balances the competing interests of
plaintiffs and defendants. Allowing states to serve as laboratories
of experimentation has been viewed generally as a positive aspect
107. CGARTER-YAmAucH, supra note 90, at ch. 6; see also Tremper, supra note 10. at 23
("[all] the legislation [has created] a false sense of security among some volunteers, combined
with uncertainty among volunteers and lawyers about the scope and effectiveness of the new
laws").
108. Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and
Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REv. 627, 686 (spring 1996) ("[S]tate courts and legisla-
tures can strike a reasonable balance between the competing interests of its citizens who cre-
ate risk of physical injury and those who are injured."); cf. Robert F. Copple, Cable Television
and the Allocation of Regulatory Power: A Study of Government Demarcation and Roles, 44
FED. COMM. L. J., 4 (Dec. 1991) (the cable industry serves as an example of how Congress
leaves a "substantial remainder of cable regulatory authority" in the hands of state and local
governing boards, as they are in a better position to address the needs of local communities);
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L. J. 569, 570 (1987) (recognizing that Congress leaves
"numerous areas free" of regulation, thereby allowing the states to establish their own
regulations).
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of federalism. Nowhere has there been more state experimenta-
tion than in tort reform.10 9
In their conclusion, Eaton and Talarico state, "[i]n light of the paucity of
reliable data regarding the operation and impact of the tort system, we
question the practical wisdom of imposing a single set of rules on all
states."' 10 It is because of this last statement's message that we may best
understand the rationale behind Congressman Porter's proposed bill; a
bill that focuses on encouraging, as opposed to preempting, the states'
authority to enact law.
Moreover, there is a constitutional issue present when resolving
which rulemaking authority is best suited for enacting legislation that
would provide immunity from civil liability for volunteer coaches partici-
pating in recreational athletic leagues. To this extent, Article I, Section
8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution states that Congress has the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]""' This language estab-
lishes that Congress will be prohibited from enacting legislation that
"neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that
the [activity] be connected in any way to interstate commerce."112 Ac-
cordingly, the individual who volunteers his/her services in a community
recreational coaching capacity is outside the scope and reach of the
Commerce Clause. The enactment of the Model State Volunteer Service
Act would support this last postulate.
Beginning with the landmark case Gibbons v. Ogden," 3 Chief Justice
Marshall first outlined Congress's commerce power: "Commerce, un-
doubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-
scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for car-
rying on that intercourse." 1 4 A century later, the Supreme Court, in
Wickard v. Filburn,"5 reaffirmed Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation
of Congress's commerce power by concluding that an activity, albeit lo-
cal and not regarded as commerce, "may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on inter-
109. Eaton & Talarico, supra note 108, at 687.
110. Id. at 690.
111. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
112. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
113. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
114. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90.
115. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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state commerce.""' 6 More recently, in United States v. Lopez," 7 the
Supreme Court once again affirmed these earlier designations by holding
that unless any real limits are drawn, "any activity can be looked upon as
commercial" and therefore, within Congress's authority under the Com-
merce Clause." 8
Protecting individuals that want to serve as volunteer coaches could
hardly be considered an activity commercial in nature, or one that would
have a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Regard-
less, one should first contemplate the respective findings of both House
Bill 911 and Senate Bill 1435, which incidentally use the identical
language:
Section 2. Findings and Purpose.
a) Findings - The Congress finds and declares that-
1) The willingness of volunteers to offer their services is deterred
by potential personal liability for simple mistakes made in the
course of volunteer service;
2) As a result, many nonprofit public and private organizations
and governmental entities . . . have been adversely affected
through the withdrawal of volunteers from boards of directors
and service in other capacities;
3) The contribution of these programs to their communities is
thereby diminished, resulting in fewer and higher cost programs
than would be obtainable if volunteers were participating; and
4) Because federal funds are expended on useful and cost-effective
social service programs which depend heavily on volunteer partici-
pation, protection of volunteerism through clarification and limi-
tation of the personal liability risks assumed by the volunteer in
connection with such participation is an appropriate subject for
federal encouragement of state reform." 9
116. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125; but see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Thomas had a problem with the use of "substantial effect" as a justification for
extending Congress' law-making authority: "The Constitution not only uses the word 'com-
merce' in a narrower sense than our case law might suggest, it also does not support the
proposition that Congress has authority over all activities that 'substantially affect' interstate
commerce."
Id. at 587.
"Even though the boundary between commerce and other matters may ignore 'economic real-
ity' and thus seem arbitrary or artificial to some, we must nevertheless respect a constitutional
line that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate
commerce."
Id. at 593.
117. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
118. Id. at 565.
119. H.R. 911, supra note 94 (emphasis added); S. 1435, supra note 99 (emphasis added).
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Indeed there are federal funds expended on many of society's social ser-
vice programs, but most of America's town recreation departments oper-
ate baseball, soccer, football, and basketball programs without the
benefit of receiving any of those so-called "federal funds."
Returning to the Supreme Court's most recent Commerce Clause de-
cision, United States v. Lopez illustrates the federal legislature's attempt
to "convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States."'120 Lopez in-
volved a youth, while in attendance at a Texas public school, who was
arrested for possession of a firearm.' 2 1 But, instead of being charged
under Texas law, the youth was charged under federal law §922, the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.122 In defending Congress's power
to enact §922, the Government advanced a two prong argument: 1) vio-
lent crimes are costly, and with insurance, these costs extend throughout
the society; and 2) as result of violent crimes, individuals perceive parts
of the country as unsafe and thereby are less willing to travel.'" The
Supreme Court addressed the Government's position by holding that the
requisite nexus was not satisfied. The possession of the firearm by a
student at a local school did not have "any concrete tie to interstate
commerce."1 2
4
Keeping with the Supreme Court's rationale, individuals who volun-
teer as coaches in recreational leagues are providing an invaluable ser-
vice to their communities. Any belief that their services have interstate
commerce implications because of the equipment used, the uniforms
worn, or the fields used is misguided. As Justice Kennedy concluded in
his concurring opinion in Lopez: "[W]ere the Federal Government to
take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas
having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
120. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
121. Id. at 551.
122. Id. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 made it a federal offense "for any indi-
vidual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988) (repealed 1995), reprinted
in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
123. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. The dissent, specifically Justice Breyer, reasoned: "1) gun-
related violence is a serious problem; 2) that problem, in turn, has an adverse effect on class-
room learning; and 3) that adverse effect on classroom learning, in turn, represents a substan-
tial threat to trade and commerce." Id. at 565. The Court, in addressing the rationale of the
dissent, stated: "Under the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child rear-
ing as 'fall[ing] on the commercial side of the line' because it provides a 'valuable service -
namely, to equip [children] with the skills they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in
the workplace."' Id.
124. Id. at 567.
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boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would
blur and political responsibility would become illusory."'125
After all, can we really expect the federal legislature's macro envi-
ronment - a forum filled with competing interests and battles over
pleasing constituents - to properly address and assure the stability of
"an atmosphere dominated by freckle-faced 8-year-oldst?]' 2 6
IV. STATES PROVIDING SPECIFIC STATUTORY PROTECTION: IT Is
Now 1996, THERE Is No ACCEPTABLE REASON As To
WHY VOLUNTEER COACHES SHOULD BE DENIED
IMMUNITY FROM LAWSUITS CITING
ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE.
Over nineteen million children, between the ages of five and four-
teen, participate in their communities' recreational baseball, softball,
and tee-ball leagues. 27 However, that statistic does not account for the
additional millions of children who participate in the other athletic activ-
ities offered in their communities' recreational leagues. Our towns and
communities need people to volunteer their time for recreational sports
activities, not because there is an economic interest involved, but be-
cause we want to provide our Nation's youth with a positive community
upbringing. Regardless of whether it goes unrecognized, participation in
community sponsored sports programs is just as vital to children's social
development as is their attending school, church or synagogue, Boy
Scouts, or other community youth groups.
Yet, it is justifiably difficult to expect parents to get involved in this
community upbringing if they have to walk on egg shells while giving
batting practice or running lay-up drills. Every state has the ability,
through its law-making authority, to rectify this problem and reassure
individuals of all ages that recreational sports leagues will be alive and
well in the 21st century.
However, not every state can be held to blame for failing to provide
volunteer coaches with statutory immunity from liability. In fact, several
states have enacted legislation protecting volunteer coaches from law-
125. Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
126. Little League Bill Is Irresistible But Shortsighted, supra note 3, at 18.
127. Erich Williams, Little League Safety Issue Not A Hit With Some National Group's
Recommendations Called Overkill, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, June 29, 1996, at C6; but see
DOUGHERTY, ET A., supra note 26, at 169 citing L.M. Micheli, Children and Sports, NEws-
wEE K, Oct. 29, 1990, at 12 (according to data compiled in the late 1980's, the number of
youngsters participating in recreational and competitive athletics, nonschool related, in this
country, was 20 million).
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suits involving incidents categorized as a volunteer coach's negligence.128
These states have taken the necessary steps in preventing the further
abuse of the legal system. In the context of competitive athletics, these
states have acknowledged that competitive participation cannot prevent
harm or injury from occurring. 12 9 However, statutory law can guide the
public's perception as to what conduct, on behalf of the volunteer recre-
ational coaches, will be deemed appropriate and to what extent will their
actions be tolerated.
New Jersey is one of the states to pass legislation specifically in favor
of volunteer coaches. In fact, New Jersey's legislation was the first en-
acted law of its kind. Moreover, New Jersey's law is the most compre-
hensive and should therefore be looked upon as the model for all states
to follow. This is not to say that the remaining states with existing statu-
tory law, protecting volunteer coaches from civil liability, are inade-
quate. Rather, it is the purpose of this article's section to illustrate two
principles: first, that the existing recreational volunteer's law effectively
manages the operation of community recreational athletics; and second,
that New Jersey's law is best suited to serve as the model act for promot-
ing nationwide uniformity in this area of the law.
In March 1986, New Jersey became the first state to enact a statute
providing volunteer athletic coaches and officials civil immunity from lia-
bility. The Act, codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2A:62A-6, was later
amended in 1988.130 It is now 1997, more than ten years have passed,
128. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-116 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6836 (1996);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-20.1 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 745, para. 80/1 (1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 344-11.8-6 (1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2798 (1995); M.D. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5-313 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85V (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604A.11 (1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:17 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6 (1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-1 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-46 (1993); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8332.1 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-48 (1994); see also 18th State Legis., 1995 H.I. S.B. 1170
(referred to Senate committee); 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1996 N.Y. A.B. 8656
(referred to the Committee on Judiciary).
129. Consider the words of T.J. Teebles, age 12: "I play to get hurt anyway,... If you're
so worried about getting hurt [while playing baseball], why don't we just wear a full football
uniform?" Williams, supra note 127, at C6. In addition, the concern that lawsuits will sup-
press the competitive nature of sports is shared by legal commentators:
Unfortunately, each injury must be recognized as a potential lawsuit. We've seen that it
is impossible to remove all risks from physical activities; for many participants, the very
element of controlled risk (or the perception of risk) is part of the enjoyment of the
sporting experience. It probably would be unwise to entirely eliminate every element
of danger even if it were possible to do so. The remaining activities would be so sterile
and unchallenging that no one would bother with them.
DOUGHERTY, ET AL., supra note 26, at 235-36.
130. N.J. § 2A:62A-6 as amended in 1988 states:
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and still the majority of states have chosen to ignore New Jersey's wis-
dom in preserving community recreational programs in society.
What initially makes New Jersey's act so appealing is its clarity in
stating exactly whom it protects. An individual who wants to coach a
little league baseball team should be able to research and understand for
himiher self whether his/her particular state affords him/her protection
from civil liability, as compared to the process of having to first hire an
attorney to interpret the laws for him/her. Where many state statutes
are ambiguous as to the extent of what organizations are protected, New
Jersey's act clearly states that all volunteer coaches, regardless if the
team they are coaching is affiliated with a non-profit sports league or
a. Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, no person who provides serv-
ices or assistance free of charge, except for reimbursement of expenses, as an athletic
coach, manager, or official, other than a sports official accredited by a voluntary associ-
ation ... and exempted from liability ... for a sports team which is organized or
performing pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter or which is a member team in a
league organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department,
shall be liable in any civil action for damages to a player, participant or spectator as a
result of his acts of commission or omission arising out of and in the course of his
rendering that service or assistance.
b. The provisions of subsection a. of this section shall apply not only to organized
sports competitions, but shall also apply to practice and instruction in that sport.
c. (1) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person causing
damage by his willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act of commission or omission, nor
to any coach, manager, or official who has not participated in a safety orientation and
training skills program which program shall include but not be limited to injury preven-
tion and first aid procedures and general coaching concepts. (2) A coach, manager, or
official shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirement of this subsection if the safety
orientation and skills training program attended by the person has met the minimum
standards established by the Governor's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports in con-
sultation with the Bureau of Recreation within the Department of Community Affairs,
in accordance with rules and regulations adopted pursuant to the "Administrative Pro-
cedure Act,"...
d. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person causing
damage as the result of his negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
e. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person for any
damage caused by that person permitting a sports competition or practice to be con-
ducted without supervision.
f. Nothing in this act shall apply to an athletic coach, manager, or official who provides
services or assistance as part of a public or private educational institution's athletic
program.
In addition to New Jersey's legislation, Pennsylvania, also in 1986, passed legislation mak-
ing it the second state to offer volunteer coaches protection from civil liability. See PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 8332.1; see also Christopher A. Terzian, Legislative Summaries: Sports Law,
Tort Liability-Athletic Coaches and Officials-Volunteers-Civil Immunity From Liability-
To Be Codified At N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:62A-6, 10 SnoN HALL LPGIs. J. 332 (1987) (for a
discussion of New Jersey and Pennsylvania's volunteer coach civil immunity from liability
legislation).
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affiliated with a municipal recreation department, are afforded
protection.131
Further, New Jersey's act limits its civil immunity to volunteer
coaches who have either caused damage or have had an injury result
from their "act of omission or commission" that would be categorized as
willful or wanton negligence.' 32 In addition, the afforded protection of
the act does not extend to the volunteer coach while in operation of any
kind of motor vehicle,' 33 who knowingly allows "sports competition or
practice to be conducted without supervision,' 34 or who is involved with
131. N.J. § 2A:62A-6 (its caption reads: "Volunteer athletic coaches, managers, or offi-
cials for non-profit sports teams or teams in league affiliated with county or municipal recrea-
tion department"); compare with CoLO. § 13-21-116 ("coach . . . for any program,
organization, association, service group, educational, social or recreational group, or nonprofit
corporation serving young persons.. ."); Mass. § 85V ("an entity which is organized as a
nonprofit corporation or nonprofit unincorporated association"); MD. § 5-313 ("'Community
recreation program' means an athletic, fitness, or recreation activity:"); N.H. § 508:17 ("Any
volunteer of a nonprofit organization or government entity.. ."); but see ILL. ch. 745, para. 80/
1 ("sports program of a nonprofit association"); LA. § 2798 (does not specify beyond "a sport-
ing activity" related to a "recognized league or association"); MnN. § 604A.11 ("a sports team
that is organized or performing under a nonprofit charter"); N.M. § 41-12-1 ("in a formally
organized nonprofit sports association"); N.D. § 32-03-46 ("nonprofit or similar charter"); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN § 8332.1 ("sports program of a nonprofit association, and no nonprofit asso-
ciation"); R.I. § 9-1-48 (youth sports programs "organized and conducted by or under the
auspices of a non-profit corporation" or established through interscholastic or intramural
leagues).
132. N.J. § 2A:62A-6. Every state which protects volunteer coaches does so to the extent
that the individual is not willful, wanton, or grossly negligent. See CARTER-YAmCICm, supra
note 90, at ch. 3; see also Comments, 48 LA. L. Rlv. 1383 (1988) ("[r]eflections on willful,
wanton, reckless, and gross negligence[:]... a 'twighlight zone which exists somewhere be-
tween ordinary negligence and intentional injury"'). However, there are three states that
elect to afford volunteer coach protection as long as that individual's conduct does not fall
"below ordinary standards of care." See ILL. ch. 745, para. 80/1; N.M. § 41-12-1; PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN § 8332.1.
133. N.J. § 2A:62A-6(d); see also ILL. ch. 745, para. 80/1(1)(i) (identical language as used
by Pennsylvania statute); MD. § 5-313 (volunteer personally liable for "negligent operation of
a motor vehicle"); MAss. § 85V (no exception for "acts or failures" related to the transporta-
tion of participants); MnN. § 604A.11(protection does not apply "if the acts or omissions arise
out of the operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle"); N.H. § 508:17 ("Volunteer
activity related to transportation or to care of the organization's premises shall be excepted
from the provisions of paragraph I, of this section."); N.D. § 32-03-46 (no immunity granted to
''person causing damage as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle"); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN § 8332.1 (1)(b)(i) (protection not extended to individuals whose "[a]cts or
omissions" are related to the "transportation of participants in a sports program or others to
or from a game, event, or practice); R.I. § 9-1-48 (no immunity granted for the negligent oper-
ation of a motor vehicle).
There are, however, a number of states which do not mention any limitations to immunity
for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See COLO. § 13-21-116; GA. § 51-1-20.1; IND.
§ 34-4-11.8-6; LA. § 9:2798; N.M. § 41-12-1.
134. N.J. § 2A:62A-6(e); see also MD. § 5-313; N.D. § 32-03-46.
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a "public or private educational institution's athletic program. "135
Although other states' statutes may incorporate additional limitations
and exceptions in the granting of civil immunity,136 New Jersey's act
properly addresses those situations rationally expected to be confronted
by the volunteer coach in a way that allows the act's construction to
avoid overly broad or narrowly drawn interpretations.
Most importantly, the New Jersey act incorporates a provision that
actually serves as a precursor to the granting of civil immunity. This pro-
vision is that the volunteer coach must participate in and complete a
safety orientation and training skills program before he or she is covered
by the law.137 The provision was added as an amendment in 1988, but it
should be viewed as the essential element for demonstrating a commit-
135. N.J. § 2A:62A-6(f); see also MiNN. § 604A.11 (limitation to granting of immunity for
athletic coaches providing "services or assistance as part of a public or private educational
institution's athletic program"); N.D. § 32-03-46 (no granting of immunity to any athletic
coach "providing service as a part of a public or private educational institution's athletic
program").
136. CoLO. § 13-21-116 ("except that such immunity from liability shall not extend to pro-
tect such person from liability for acts or omissions which harm third persons"); DEL. tit. 16,
§ 6836 (cap on damages, as related to the amount of insurance coverage); ILL. ch. 745, para.
80/1 (exception as to the "care and maintenance of real estate unrelated to the practice or
playing areas which such persons or nonprofit associations own, possess or control"); LA.
§ 9:2798 ("The receipt of a small stipend or incidental compensation for volunteer services
shall not exclude any person, who is otherwise covered, from the limitation of liability pro-
vided.. ."); MD. § 5-313 ("This section does not create, and may not be construed as creating,
a new cause of action or substantive legal right against an athletic official or volunteer.");
MAss. § 85V (immunity limited to leagues "for participants who are eighteen years of age or
younger"); MINN. § 604A.11 (grant of immunity does not extend to the volunteer coach's acts
or omissions to the extent that they are "covered under an insurance policy issued to the entity
for who the coach ... serves"); N.H. § 508:17 ("[t]he volunteer had prior written approval
from the organization to act on behalf of the organization"); N.M. § 41-12-1 (volunteer coach
must be participating in a league for persons under eighteen years of age); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN § 8332.1 (exception as to the "care and maintenance of real estate unrelated to the prac-
tice or playing areas which such persons or nonprofit associations own, possess or control");
R.I. § 9-1-48 ("'youth sports programs' ... whose participants are nineteen (19) years of age
or younger or physically or mentally handicapped regardless of age").
137. N.J. § 2A:62A-6(c)(2). Unfortunately, only two other states, providing volunteer
coaches with statutory immunity from civil liability, require that their volunteers participate in
a safety program. See LA. § 2798 (protection is applicable upon participation "in a safety
orientation and training program" or it may be waived "upon submission of appropriate docu-
mented evidence as to that individual's proficiency in first aid and safety"); N.D. § 32-03-46
(coach's - "participat[ion] in a safety orientation and training program established by the
league or team with which the person is affiliated" must first be met); but see N.H. § 508:17
("In the case of volunteer athletic coaches or sports officials, such volunteers shall possess
proper certification or validation of competence in the rules, procedures, practices, and pro-
grams of the athletic activity.")
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ment toward taking the necessary steps in protecting everyone partici-
pating in recreational athletic leagues.138
Currently only a small number of states have enacted volunteer pro-
tection laws specifically focused around the services rendered by the vol-
unteer recreational athletic coach. But, if there is an established
rationale behind this specific statutory construction, why is there no sig-
nificant push toward nationwide statutory protection in this area of the
law? Do the other states conclude that this statutory framework is too
unreasonable or simply unnecessary?
Clearly there is room for such statutory designations to be made in
this area of an individual state's laws. This is especially true when recog-
nizing that some states specifically grant immunity to volunteer recrea-
tional athletic officials 139 and rodeo participants140 for acts constituting
ordinary negligence. At the same time, the states find volunteer recrea-
tional coaches undeserving of the same statutory protection. Further,
there is the nationwide existence and acceptance of laws which are en-
acted for the specific purpose of safeguarding the interests of individuals
who volunteer to serve as directors and officers for nonprofit corpora-
tions,' 4 ' or who render assistance as a Good Samaritan. 4
"With thousands of nine-year-old rifle arms throwing thousands of
baseballs as thousands of [1]ittle [1league parents look on, the likelihood
of an errant throw is obvious. It's sad, but emblematic of our times, that
such an incident results in litigation.' '143
138. For an example of how the act's provision is complied with see YOUTH SPORTS RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, COACHES REFERENCE MANUAL, 2ND ED., THm RUTGERS S.A.F.E.T.Y.
CLINIC (1994); see also Byrne v. Fords-Clara Barton Boys Baseball League, 564 A.2d 1222
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (upholding the requirement that a volunteer coach must first participate
in a safety orientation program before qualifying for New Jersey's statutory immunity);
DOUGHERTY, ET AL., supra note 26, at 169 (advocating the position that volunteer coaches
should be provided with adequate training).
139. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-120-102(b) (Michie 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3601 (1993);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-9-3 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.630 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-
50-201-203 (1994).
140. ALA. CODE § 6-5-337 (1994); MONT. CODE ArN. § 27-1-733 (1994); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-18 (1995).
141. See generally CARTER-YAMAUCHI, supra note 90 (for a state-by-state examination of
enacted laws that afford civil immunity to directors and officers of nonprofit corporations).
142. Robert A. Mason, Good Samaritan Laws - Legal disarray: An Update, 38 MERCER
L. REV. 1440 (1987) ("The disparity between moral obligation and legal duty is somewhat
exacerbated because one who decides to rescue must undertake to do so nonnegligently to
avoid civil liability to the victim."). Currently, every state has adopted some form of Good
Samaritan laws, there are 117 in all. Id. at Table I.
143. The Windup, the Pitch, the Suit, supra note 32, at 31.
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V. CONCLUSION
This article's intention was to develop a framework, enabling the
reader to recognize that a segment of the American fabric is in jeopardy,
the willingness of individuals to serve as volunteer coaches in their com-
munity recreational sports leagues.
In January of 1993, President Bush, while at a Points of Light celebra-
tion, declared: "I believe that it's time we ought to care for each other
more and sue each other less."1"" But, what does this suggest when it is
spoken by the leader of the entire nation? That we possess and support
a legal system that manipulates the direction of our everyday living.
It is ironic when one realizes that the people bringing the lawsuits
against these volunteer sports coaches were probably once themselves
participants in similar recreational sports leagues. The proper declara-
tion is that society's individuals need to become more involved, more
responsible, and more accountable for the doings and lack of doings, of
themselves and their children. It is not a proclamation that recreational
sports leagues will prevent society's youth from going astray, but in this
technology driven age do we want our children's aspirations to be the
achieving of the title "Sega-Genesis Neighborhood Champion?"
Society must accept the reality that participation in athletic activities
involves risks; more than those faced while sitting four feet away from
the television screen on a warm, beautiful spring day.
144. Remarks at a Celebration of the Points of Light, 29 WEBKLY CoMI'. PRES. Doc. 42
(Jan. 14, 1993) (emphasis added).
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